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Abstract 
Different policy standards among NATO-members are only sparsely communicated in the 
broader research literature focusing on the alliance. Both in terms of the purely empirical 
aspect concerning how many and what kind, and to what extent different policy standards can 
have an impact on NATO’s role in international relations. The objective of this thesis is to 
uncover some of these circumstances. Based on a comparative analysis of four NATO-
members – the US, the UK, Germany and Norway – three diverging patterns in regard to use 
of private military contractors are exposed. The results are thereafter discussed in regard to 
the contemporary NATO-debate concerning NATO’s role in international relations. If left 
unanswered, the different approaches towards the use of private military contractors have the 
potential of negatively influencing internal cohesion and solidarity.    
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1 Introduction 
The end of the Cold War has re-introduced private military and security enterprises in 
international relations and security policy. The use of private military contractors is nothing 
new, but the contemporary dominant state-centred paradigm has displayed the use of private 
actors by sovereign states in international relations as rather controversial. During and until 
the end of the Cold War, private military contractors (PMC) where affiliated with clandestine 
and political dirty operations on the behalf of the superpowers. The end of the Cold War 
however, initiated a revival of the previous controversial private marked for force. As a result, 
PMCs have to a very large extent been part of every major NATO-operation since the alliance 
intervention on the Balkans during the 1990ies.  
Contemporary research (Avant, 2005:30-38; Mandel, 2001; Matlary & Østerud, 2005; Singer, 
2001; Østerud, 2005) indicates three main reasons for the development of the private security 
industry within the contemporary security environment. The first reason was the end of the 
Cold-War itself, resulting in vast surpluses of standing military personnel. As a result, huge 
numbers of individuals with military training, uniquely suited to the requirements of the 
private military industry, were looking for a new occupation. At the same time, both security 
challenges, and the ability for states to intervene and respond to these challenges has changed. 
Old unresolved conflicts which had been held at bay by above pressure from the superpowers 
now surfaced back up to the contemporary conflict environment. However, many great 
powers were no longer automatically willing to intervene abroad to restore stability and peace 
because, many conflict regions, due to reduced ideology and imperial value, no longer 
represented a vital security threat to the national interests of the former hegemonies.  Yet, the 
need for high quality military expertise was still acute. 
Second, military operations today have become highly technologic and sophisticated, and 
therefore more reliant on civilian specialists. The revolution in military affairs demands 
intensive cooperation between militaries and the industries which are producing modern 
weapon systems. Because it is more cost intensive and time consuming to educate military 
personnel alone to operate modern weapon systems, private contractors have been 
implemented in the maintaining and operation of these systems (Østerud, 2005:91).    
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The third reason is the normative shift since the 1980ies towards increased marked 
liberalisation of the public sphere, based on the assumption that the private sector is both 
more efficient and more effective. The success of many privatisation programs have not only 
given privatising a legitimate label, but also further pushed the idea to privatise any function 
that can be handled outside government (Singer, 2001:198). Moreover, when it comes to 
financing a new military project Western governments often prefer private initiatives because 
the costs for the government will be spread more evenly over the duration of the contract. 
Although the cumulative costs in total often are higher, governments may eliminate obstacles 
in securing parliamentary control in the short run for projects with huge start-up costs in a 
particular fiscal year (Krahmann, 2005b:253).  
1.1 Research problem 
The growth of the private military industry (PMI) raises a concern which challenges the 
political state-centric paradigm at its very core. Critics have argued that the introduction of 
PMCs reduces the state’s control over the use of force (Avant, 2005; Markusen, 2003). The 
core logic of this paradigm is the understanding that the state is the only legitimate actor over 
the control, sanctioning and use of force. This particular logic is in much of the political 
science theory one of the fundamental symbols of state sovereignty. Especially the Weberian 
school and political realism has fronted this line of thinking.1 The state-centric paradigm has 
also been dominating the political discourse over the last 200 years. However, the often 
theoretical static assumptions about state sovereignty may be misguiding in explaining the 
real world. Berndtsson (2009:36-41) argues that the relationship between the state and the use 
of violence, and the meaning of state sovereignty in this regard, has been, and continues to be 
variable in nature. Berndtsson’s point of departure is Tilly’s definition of a state;  
“an organisation controlling the principals means of coercion within  a given 
territory, which is differentiated from other organisations operating in the same territory, 
autonomous, centralized and formally coordinated” (Tilly (1975b; 1992) in Berndtsson, 
2009: 37).  
Full monopolies of control of the use of force have however never existed, and do not exist 
today except in the form of ideal-models which are subject to renegotiations. In regard to the 
privatisation of the use of force, Berndtsson, therefore argues that it is not appropriate to 
                                                 
1 For more theoretical background see: Max Weber (1968). The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation. 
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portray the process privatisation the defence sector as purely as an erosion or end of the state-
centric paradigm. Rather, privatisation of force is better understood in terms of state change. 
In his view, the state has not lost its function of being the sovereign, yet the regulative rules of 
sovereignty as an institution have changed and (in some states) accepted the recurrence of 
private contractors fulfilling coercive service functions on behalf of the state.2  
The objective of this thesis is to apply these insights to the case of NATO. Different NATO-
members have approached the use of PMCs in very different ways. NATO-members such as 
the US and the UK have to a wide extent relied on the provision of military functions from 
PMCs. Contrary, other NATO-members such as Germany have been very restrictive towards 
the privatisation of force. Thus, for the case of NATO, an alliance built on the principles of 
democracy and consensus, an inconsistency therefore occurs when alliance-members have 
accepted the recurrence of PMCs into their civil-military relations at a varying degree. The 
aim of this thesis’ first research question is to address the empirical aspect of this 
inconsistency by asking: 
Which different policy standards do NATO members have towards the use of PMCs? 
The aim of this second research question is to set the results from the first research question 
into a broader perspective by asking: 
How do different approaches towards the use of PMCs affect NATO’s internal cohesion and 
solidarity?  
Different policy standards among NATO-members are only sparsely communicated in the 
broader research literature focusing on the alliance. Both in terms of the purely empirical 
aspect concerning how many and what kind, and to what extent different policy standards can 
have an impact on NATO’s role in international relations. The objective of this thesis is to 
uncover some of these circumstances.  
 
                                                 
2 ‘Accepted’ is here seen in the light of a democratic regime. For the purpose of simplicity, this MA thesis 
assumes that it is up to a democratic elected government, and thereby implicit the will of the citizens, to loosen 
the principle of state sovereignty. The theoretical debate over the causal direction of whether political institutions 
are determining, ordering and modifying individual needs, or whether political institutions are best understood as 
the aggregated behaviour of groups and individuals is out of the scope of this study. See for example: James G. 
March and Johan P.  Olsen (1984). The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life.   
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1.2 Research design 
This section briefly presents the research design applied to solve this paper’s research 
questions. Each of the introduced aspects will be further elaborated in their respective 
chapters. This thesis has the aim of conducting a comparative analysis based on a strategic 
selection of NATO-members. In order to capture the diversity among NATO-members when 
it comes to their use of PMCs, and also to secure representation of both sides with the internal 
NATO-debate regarding NATO’s role in international relations, this Thesis has selected the 
following cases:  the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Germany (GER), and 
Norway (NOR). Given this research’s point of departure, four cases are sufficient, because an 
inconsistency in principle already occurs if one member-diverges.  
The data used are primary sources such as government instructions and directions found on 
under selected cases governmental homepages. These are further supplemented with 
secondary sources who have conducted research in the same field, using the same cases which 
are under study here. The focus will be on data providing governmental guidelines. Tracing 
each single contract requires recourses far beyond the scope of this Thesis. For instance, 
between 1994 and 2002 US-based PMCs received more than 3000 contracts form the US 
Department of Defence (DoD) (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2008:135). Moreover, engaged 
contracts are usually also withheld from public insight.  
The purpose of this thesis is to explain and understand different policy standards with the help 
from the civil-military relations literature. Different policy standards can arguably be captured 
by the theoretical insights from the classical works of Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960). 
The civil-military relations literature is well suited because it is concerned with the problem 
of civilian control over the armed forces. PMCs represent a new dimension to the problem of 
civilian control. It is therefore fruitful to categorise NATO-members according to their 
understanding of the civil-military relationship because different policy standards in this 
regard leads to a questioning of the alliance legitimacy. The introduction of PMCs requires an 
institutional development of civil-military relations which will maximize security at least 
sacrifice of other social values and groups. 
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1.3 Definitions, assumptions, and delimitations 
This section contains the underlying definitions, assumptions and delimitations which this 
thesis is subject to. In order to present a clear understanding of what type, and with what 
delimitations PMCs are understood in this thesis, this sections contains review of the often 
confusing terms private military contractor, private military industry, privatisation, and 
provision of services provided by private actors. This paper’s analysis, discussion, and 
inferences are all to be understood in the light of the studies underlying assumptions if not 
stated otherwise. 
Regarding the concept of PMCs, the literature is vast and detailed, yet inconsistent. A clear 
working definition and explanation of the term private military contractor is therefore needed. 
In order to search for diversity among NATO members policy towards the privatisation of 
military functions, I intend to apply the analysis at the industrial level of analysis, and not 
with a particular firm.  
Mandel (2001:136-139) classifies private military industry in terms of purpose, scope, and 
form.  The aim of his classification is to entangle the different patterns of security that are, 
according to Mandel, captured by the umbrella concept of privatised security. The issue of 
purpose has the aim of distinguishing between offensive and defensive reasons to privatise 
security. The motive of the recipient of security services is the key to splitting the two 
categories. If the motive of the recipient is to keep order, guard facilities, and maintaining the 
status quo, then the purpose is defensive. On the other hand, when a recipient of private 
security utilises the services provided to overthrow a sitting regime, then is the purpose 
clearly offensive.  
The issue of scope captures the relationship of the security provider and the receiver. 
Privatised security may either be supplied by a firm in one state, to either government or non-
government parties in another state. However, the provider and the recipient may also be 
within the same state. A further sub-classification within the issue of scope is whether 
privatised security is initiated as either top-down or bottom-up. A top-down initiation occurs 
when governments decide to privatise its internal of external military functions to private 
contractors. Contrary, bottom-up initiation occurs when individuals and weakly organised 
societal groups, such as militias, vigilantes, or neighbourhood groups, decide for themselves 
to initiate provisions of security services to themselves or others.  
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The issue of form reflects the kind of services PMCs provide. According to Mandel, the most 
crucial distinction is between combat support and military advisory. Due to its immediate 
strategic impact is it widely recognised that direct combat support should be distinguished 
from other military provisions. Combat support is by Mandel defined as direct military 
operational support in terms of personnel or weapon systems. Military advisory services refer 
to training, and strategy and tactical consulting. 
Singer (2001) provides a similar understanding of the issue of form, although slightly more 
graded. Singer divides the security industry into three forms; military provider firms, military 
consulting firms, and military support firms. The first form, military provider firms, focuses 
on the tactical environment. They often act as force multipliers with their employees 
distributed across a client’s military force. In effect, private firms of the first type provide 
their services at the frontline, often engaging in actual fighting. The second form, military 
consulting firms provide training and advisory services based on strategic, operational and 
organisational analysis. The critical difference between the first and the second form of 
privatised security is their involvement in actual combat. Although military consulting firms 
provide a tactical advantage, it is their clients who bear the final battlefield risks. The third 
form, military support, provides supplementary services such as logistics, technical support 
and transportation. The combat services these contractors provide are critical to a client’s 
combat operations, but they do not participate in the planning and execution of hostilities at 
the front line. These firms often look more like multi-national corporations who seek to 
maximize their established capabilities and further extend their range of services. Military 
provider and consulting firms on the other hand usually have the purpose and aim to target a 
specific market. (Singer, 2001:200-202) 
The next debate has evolved around what labels are to be used to describe the private military 
industry, and how are actors in the industry to be defined.3 Mandel uses the label 
“privatisation of security” to describe the delegation of military functions, and “private 
                                                 
3 The labels “private”, “military”, “security”, “company”, and “contractor” have often been interchanged or used 
in different combinations, both by the academic literature and by the media. In some instances have the terms 
military and security reflected the nature of services that a private firm would offer. The PMI has over the last 
decade reduced its emphasis on the term military in order to present itself in a more civilised and less 
controversial manner. Many private firms use the label security in their public appearances, while they still 
provide services which are military in character. See: Molly Dunigan (2011). Victory for Hire. Private Security 
Companies' Impact on Military Effectiveness;  Andrea Schneiker (2007). Aus Söldnern werden Geschäftsleute: 
Die Marketingstrategien privater Militärfirmen. For literature concerning PMC in relation to the classic 
mercenary, see: Peter W.  Singer (2001). Corporate Warriors. The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and 
Its Ramifications for International Security.:192-193. 
7 
 
military company” to describe the hired non-state actor. These labels are precise in the sense 
that they highlight the process of privatisation, which is the delegation from public to private. 
In contrast, Singer deliberately uses the term “firm” rather than “company”.  Singer argues 
that the term company only captures firms who provide tactical services. The term firm is 
intended to be broader and to capture the whole industry and not only portions of it. 
Moreover, the term firm is according to Singer better theoretically rooted, drawing from 
insights for economic theory. Therefore, based on his research, Singer uses the following 
definition for private military firms: 
“Profit-driven organisations that trade in professional services intricately linked to 
warfare. They are corporate bodies that specialise in the provision of military skill – 
including tactical combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence gathering and analysis, 
operational support, troop training, and military technical assistance” (Singer, 2001:186).   
A third alternative is provided by Krahmann (2005a:278) who uses the term “services”. 
Krahmann changes the focus from military companies or firms to military services. Private 
military services are by Krahmann defined as; “services directly related to the provision of 
national and international security which are offered by registered companies”. These services 
can take a variety of forms such as military combat, training, logistics and advice.  
Although Singer is slightly more precise than Krahmann, they both emphasise three core 
aspects. First, they are corporate and registered actors, not just loosely organised vigilantes. 
Second, they provide a service uniquely suited to national and international military security, 
penetrating into the domain of the sovereign state when viewed through the lenses of the state 
centric paradigm. Third, the broad spectrum of services renders states the possibility to 
privatise almost any military function, although the weight of the services provided is in the 
less heavy armoured, and less voluminous in terms of material functions of the military 
establishment.  
With the purpose of parsimony and in light of the contemporary debate in the literature, this 
thesis will use the term private military contractor (PMC). The emphasis on the labels 
private, military, and contractor, are chosen and justified by the following reasons. Private is 
to indicate that a non-state actor, either domestic or foreign, is responsible for the execution of 
a previously state managed military function. The term military is used to explicitly state the 
relation to a given military function. It is thereby easy to demarcate the service provided by a 
PMC to a public military establishment and avoid confusion towards private security as we 
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know it from shopping malls and airports. The term contractor emphasises the reflection of 
the principal-agent relationship that exists between the state and its military establishment. 
Moreover, the term contractor further represents the juridical contractually bounding that 
exists in such a relationship.  
In order to derive a working definition for the purpose of this Thesis, I intend to proceed with 
Singer’s definition as a fundament, combined with logic of Krahmann’s “services”. 
Nevertheless, although I wish to apply Krahmann’s view that PMCs provide a service, I will 
stick to the label of contractor, and implicitly assume that a given contractor is providing a 
service according to form, scope and purpose as it is determined above.  For the purpose of 
this thesis, a private military contractor is thus; a corporate registered organisation which 
specialises in the provision of military functions which are inherently vital to the recipient’s 
successful management of military security.  
Military functions and militaries ability to generate security is here understood in the light of 
a system. This thesis is not the right medium for a comprehensive review of the full system 
theory. For the present purpose it is sufficient with a presentation of the core logic in order to 
better understand the fulcrum of the discussion of this Thesis.  
A system may be defined as complex of interacting elements. The single elements, the 
interaction among them, and the whole, are the three key aspects for analysing a system. This 
further implies that change in one element of the system initiates a change in one or several 
other elements of the system. A system is thus a whole that cannot be reduced to the sum of 
its elements by ignoring the interaction among them. The interrelated elements further define 
the boundaries of the system, and demarcate it from other systems of the same kind (Bailey, 
2002:383).  
The successful management of military security requires a military establishment where all 
the elements of the system, hereafter broadly termed military functions, such as air, sea, and 
land forces, work together. This in turn requires that the respective subordinate military 
functions of the military branches, such as planning, logistics, maintenance of weapon 
systems, and the offensive and defensive operations, also work with and not against each 
other. By privatising one or several military functions such as logistics or intelligence 
gathering, the state becomes reliant on non-state actors for the management of its military 
system. In fact, one of the key claims by Avant (2005), Markusen (2003) and Singer (2001) is 
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that the US for instance, is increasingly reliant on PMC to exercise conventional military 
force. The privatising of military functions in the US has escalated so far since the Cold War 
that “the US cannot go to war without contractors” (Avant, 2005:115). 
The issue of form, the kind of services provided, is therefore demarcated to military services 
that provide an operational military function in the system of the recipient’s military 
establishment during a deployment in a theatre of conflict. The judicial literature speaks in 
this regard of coercive and non-coercive services. Coercive services are interrogation 
functions, intelligence gathering, arrest and detention, or other services which imply coerced 
subordination by the force addressees (Francioni, 2011:101). This thesis will use the term 
coercive services as defined here, whereas the term non-coercive services refer to logistic 
services etc. Both are equally important to the military system, and fall under the term military 
functions if not otherwise specified.  
The term “private military industry” (PMI) refers to where private military contractors are 
hired from. In line with Mandel’s taxonomy, states may contract both domestic and foreign 
PMC, which therefore make the private military industry inherently international in character. 
Some of the work of other scholars referenced in this Thesis uses the term private security 
industry or security and military industry. In order to correctly cite their work, I will during 
this Thesis sometimes use their labels interchangeably with my own term PMI. The meaning 
of the term is however understood as defined here.  
The term “privatisation” will be used to describe the process of delegating the execution of a 
military function to a private military contractor. Privatisation is preferred over the term 
“outsourcing”, because it distinctively highlights that a non-state actor is made responsible. 
Outsourcing for instance, may be misunderstood to also occur within the state to another 
agency or bureau. Drawing on Berndtsson (2009:7) once more, it is important to emphasize 
that privatisation is to be understood as a process of increasing reliance on PMCs for the 
conduction of military functions that have been or are being seen as tasks belonging to the 
public domain. Privatisation is thus not a complete erosion of state control or full dependence 
on PMCs.  
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1.4 Course of action 
The thesis will proceed with presenting the theoretical and methodological concept in chapter 
2. I will begin with laying the theoretical background concept based on Huntington and 
Janowitz. From the theoretical background I intend to derive a systematised concept of two 
theories, which in turn are to be incorporated with the chosen research method.  With the 
theoretical and methodological concept in place follows the comparative analysis of the 
selected cases in chapter 3. The aim of the analysis is to solve the thesis’ first research 
question. The findings of the empiric analysis are to be entangled and ordered to into 
systemised patterns, if such a theorizing is indeed possible with the found data.  
In the second part of this thesis, are the results of the analysis to be discussed in the light of 
the contemporary NATO-debate. Before final conclusions are drawn, the findings and 
interferences in this MA project will first be discussed in regard to the methodological and 
theoretical limitations that this MA project’s design is subject to.  
11 
 
2 Theoretical and methodological 
concept 
This chapter presents the theoretical and methodological concepts which together make up the 
analytical instrument. The chapter will in the first four sections present the methodological 
approach for solving the first research question. The first section contains the theoretical 
background, which is drawn from two major contributions within the civil-military relations 
literature. The following section sets the two theoretical contributions in relation to each 
other, and further presents the logic underlying the operationalization of the theoretical 
concept. The third section incorporates the theoretical concept with the methodological 
approach in order to complete the analytical framework, before the fourth section presents the 
indicators for the classification of the cases under study. Finally, the fifth section presents the 
methodological approach regarding the thesis’ second research question.   
2.1 Theoretical background 
The civil-military relations literature is both rich and interdisciplinary, including contributions 
from philosophy, history, political science, and sociology. However, within the state-centric 
paradigm two landmarks stand out, and much of the literature that has been written has been 
an implicit or explicit response to these works. The vast literature has greatly contributed to 
the study of civil-military relations, but it has not been able to challenge the theoretical 
paradigms of the landmark theories by Samuel Huntington (1957) and Morris Janowitz (1960) 
(Feaver, 1999:213).4 As many other scholars, both Huntington and Janowitz attempt to 
theorize the institutionalisation of a state’s civil-military relations. Huntington writes in the 
field of political science whereas Janowitz works more interdisciplinary, drawing on insights 
from both political science and sociology, with most of the weight on the latter. They provide 
two different understandings of how the military should be integrated with the rest of society. 
It is important to emphasise that they both derive their theories from a democratic 
                                                 
4 For literature concerning the development of the civil-military literature, and its relations in regard to PMCs, 
see: Deborah Avant (1998). Conflicting Indicators of "Crisis" in American Civil-Military Relations;  Robert 
Bates, Avnar Greif and Smita  Singh (2002). Organizing Violence;  Douglas L. Bland (2001). Patterns in Liberal 
Democratic Civil-Military Relations;  James Burk (2002). Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations;  
Richard Kohn (1997). How Democracies Control the Military;  Robert Mandel (2001). The Privatization of 
Security;  Ann R. Markusen (2003). The Case Against Privatizing National Security;  Rebecca L. Schiff (1995). 
Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance. 
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understanding, defending democratic civilian control over the military, yet they differ in their 
perception on what particular type of democracy. Military professionalism is the main 
independent (explanatory) variable in both contributions. Professionalism is by both theorists 
understood as trade or craft distinguished from the laymen, rather than professional in the 
sense of standing- or conscript armies. Due to their diverging normative understanding of 
what a democracy is, Huntington’s and Janowitz’ theories present two different ideal-models, 
based on military professionalism, theorising the institutionalisation of civil-military relations. 
Before I continue with the systematisation of the theoretical concept, I will first present the 
theories of Huntington and Janowitz respectively.   
2.1.1 Huntington – autonomous integration. 
According to Huntington, the fulcrum of civil-military relations is the balance between a 
state’s functional and societal imperative. The functional imperative represents the outside 
threats to the state’s security and survival. The societal imperative captures trends, values and 
norms dominant within society. The functional and societal spheres of society are 
distinctively separate, pulling the military establishment of the state in opposite directions. It 
may be impossible for the military to effectively maintain the state’s security if it solely 
would reflect social values. Contrary, it may be impossible to contain the military within the 
norms and values of society if it purely were concerned with functional imperatives 
(Huntington, 1957:2).  
Burk (2002:13), inter alia, criticizes Huntington’s distinctively separation of the military and 
civilian sphere.5 Burk argues that in a world with nuclear weapons, there can be no clear 
distinction between the two. A nuclear war would be all encompassing, affecting all spheres 
of life. Burk is aiming his criticism solely at theory and not with empirical questions of the 
interpenetration of spheres. Burk emphasises that also Huntington recognised the interrelation 
of military and political affairs, yet Huntington thought it was desirable and also possible to 
maintain a functional separation of civic and military matters.   
In regard to real world circumstances I would agree with Burk. However, I chose to align with 
Huntington specifically for this Thesis’ analytical purposes for two reasons. First, it can be 
                                                 
5 For more theoretical discussions of Huntington and Janowitz see: Peter D. Feaver (1996). The Civil-Military 
Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control;  Peter D. Feaver (1998). Crisis as 
Shirking: An Agency Theory Explanation of the Souring of American Civil-Military Relations;  Peter D. Feaver 
(1999). Civil-Military Relations. 
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argued that today’s wars are optional in the sense that they do not pose an existential risk to 
states in the NAR (Matlary, 2009).  Many societies in the NAR have therefore become 
potentially alienated from warfare in foreign regions. Second, in the context of PMCs, the 
security environment is again to a great extent reduced to conventional forces. The purpose of 
the PMI is to supply niche military functions as an asset to public militaries, not to replace 
them. PMCs are hired to accomplish a given military function within specified limits under 
greater military operations which is directed by circumstances outside the scope of PMCs. 
Acknowledging these circumstances, it becomes appropriate to speak of separate spheres for 
analytical purposes.  
Returning to Huntington, the challenge in civil-military relations is consequently to reconcile 
a military strong enough to protect the state, with a military subordinate enough to do only 
what civilians authorise them to do. Huntington presents two answers for civilian control over 
the military. Subjective civilian control, where one maximizes civilian power, and objective 
civilian control, where one maximizes military professionalism. Subjective civilian control 
maximises the power of civilian groups in relation to the military. However, the pluralistic 
composition of society makes it often impossible for groups within society to unite as a whole 
with respect to the military. As a result, maximising civilian power usually means maximising 
the power of one particular group within society such as particular governmental institutions, 
a particular social class, or particular constitutional forms (Huntington, 1957:80-81). 
Objective civilian control on the other hand seeks to maximise military professionalism, and 
is thus directly opposed to subjective control. The purpose of objective civilian control is to 
cut the link between certain groups of society and the military by militarising the military, and 
thereby making the military a tool of state as a whole. Whereas subjective civilian control 
presupposes the involvement of the military in political affairs, objective civilian control 
opposes this involvement because it decreases civilian control for the society as a whole when 
the military becomes webbed into institutional, class and constitutional politics. Thus, the 
essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military 
professionalism. Professionalism in the sense of objective civilian control leaves the military 
politically neutral. Military power is limited to the degree that is does not favour any civilian 
group within society. It represents a standard which every individual of society can recognise 
and relate to (Huntington, 1957:83-84). 
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By giving the military autonomous freedom one must eventually rely on its degree of 
professionalism. Military professionalism is consequently a constant standard shaped by the 
craft’s functional imperative:  
“The continuing objective performance of the professional function gives rise to a 
continuing professional [...] “mind”. The military mind in this sense, consist of the values, 
attitudes, and perspectives which inhere in the performance of the professional military 
function and which are deductible from the nature of that function.”(Huntington, 1957:61)  
The professional standard is to be understood as an abstract Weberian ideal-type by which it 
is possible to judge its degree of professionalism. Three characteristics inhere to the military 
profession – the professional soldier’s relationship towards society, national security policy, 
and finally the state itself (Huntington, 1957:62).   
Regarding the military’s relationship towards society, Huntington presents the military man as 
the man of Hobbes. Through centuries of accumulated experience has the military mind 
evolved as pessimistic about human nature. The military profession has been constantly 
confronted with irrationality, bellicosity and evil. It therefore recognises the importance of 
order and hierarchy. Only the collective can win over the egocentric individual. Second, the 
military profession is responsible for the security of the state. The military profession 
recognises the primacy of the state both because the purpose of the state cannot be its own 
destruction, and the military’s dependence on the state itself. Without the existence of a state, 
there is no desirability to maintain a military profession.  War and destruction is therefore to 
be avoided. In maintaining the security of the state, the military is therefore rather defensive 
than offensive. Third, the relation of the military profession towards the state is based upon a 
strict division of labour. There are two guiding principles in this relationship - the proper 
subordination of the autonomous military profession to policy defined by objective civilian 
control, and the responsibility of the military expert. These responsibilities of the latter are 
threefold. The first is the representative function. The military profession is the advocate and 
representative for military security within the greater state structure. Second is the role of the 
advisor. The military profession is responsible to give purely functional advice to the civilian 
leadership, when the latter asks for the military’s opinion in order to make a decision between 
different policy alternatives. The third responsibility is the military’s executive function. The 
military profession is responsible to implement the state policies, even if these policies run 
counter to the military’s expert advice (Huntington, 1957:62-72). 
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In sum, the Huntingtonian institutionalisation of the civil-military relationship is understood 
as an autonomous integration, relying on the military professionalism’s sense of commitment 
and obligation towards the state. It is autonomous in the sense that it is not shaped by political 
or societal trends. The military profession is purely shaped by the functional imperative 
representing the nature of war and threats to the state, and not by politics. The military further 
subordinates itself politically to the state in exchange for professional autonomy to matters 
concerning the functional aspect of state security and the use of force.  
2.1.2 Janowitz – controlled integration.  
Janowitz’ (1960) work is the second theoretical fundament in the field of civil-military 
relations. Like Huntington, Janowitz focuses on the professionalism of the officer corps, yet 
he does not distinguish strictly between a military and a civilian sphere. Janowitz rather 
acknowledges the contemporary developments of his time. Modern military developments 
have dramatically changed the managerial requirements which must be met in order to 
successfully implement the use of force. Technological developments within modern weapon 
systems have had the consequence of civilising the military. It is no longer only about man 
against man in brute combat, but very much about maintenance and operation of complex 
systems which are far from the physical battlefield yet highly necessary in modern warfare. 
Weapons of mass destruction pose an equally risk to both military personnel and civilians.  
However, despite these developments, Janowitz argues for the continuity of the military’s 
distinctive characteristics. These include willingness and readiness to act. Despite modern 
weapons systems, no military commander can rely on victory solely based on one initial first 
strike. Warfare is repeatable in nature, involving the subsequent exchange of force between 
two antagonists. Military personnel must therefore display a willingness and preparation to 
carry on the struggles as soldiers. Traditional characteristic of heroism deeply embedded in 
the military profession play a central role here. The willingness to face danger cannot be 
supplanted by a rational approach to arms innovation. The increased importance of deterrence 
in international relations due weapons of mass destruction is a political strategy. Nevertheless, 
an effective deterrence is dependent on a well maintained military establishment prepared to 
act out the formulated deterrence (Janowitz, 1960:31-36).  
Opposing demands of traditional military heroism and modern management of weapon 
systems as a result of merging civilian and military spheres confront the military profession 
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with a dilemma.  Janowitz therefore argues that the contemporary world requires a new ideal-
type of military role and with it a new military self-conception which Janowitz defines as the 
constabulary concept. Under this new concept, the distinction between peacetime and war in 
military organisation becomes no longer feasible. The military is under the constabulary 
concept continuously prepared to act, only implementing the least required amount of force 
that is necessary to achieve its objectives (Janowitz, 1960:417-419).  
The maintenance of the military self-esteem under the new constabulary concept requires that 
the civilian leadership is constantly aware of contemporary conditions of employment in the 
military. Modern rationality and technological innovation weaken the military’s traditional 
authority. Since (military) honour may be defined as a traditional value, the transformation of 
modern militaries promotes the growth of critical attitudes towards the purposes of the 
military profession. There is therefore the need for clear guidance and rationale of purpose 
from the state leadership. Society at whole also has a responsibility in this regard. The civilian 
population must not only recognise its dependence on the military establishment but also the 
meaningfulness of the professional military career. This can at times be hard for a democratic 
society because honour, as the highest perceived value in the military, is generally seen as 
inappropriate in a democratic society. The concept of military honour finds itself therefore 
often under constant pressure from the contemporary values and norms of society. 
Consequently, the military profession itself must also undergo changes from within in order to 
meet the technical specialisations which have transformed the military, and its relation to the 
rest of society. The military profession must develop a commitment to the democratic system 
and an understanding of how it works. It must further be sensitive to the political and social 
consequences of military action. The military profession’s perception of itself must therefore 
respond to changes in social values, norms and trends in society at large (Janowitz, 1960:216-
225; 235; 439).  
In effect, Janowitz’ understanding of professionalism is more integrated compared to 
Huntington’s autonomous model. Just like Huntington, Janowitz also emphasises and defends 
civilian control over the military establishment, and neutrality in politics (Janowitz, 
1960:233). Professionalism under the constabulary concept however requires the converging 
of societal and military values. In contrast to Huntington, military professionalism in the 
sense of Janowitz is not granted the same degree of autonomy. It is however to be 
compensated with sufficient prestige and respect from society. As a result, the military 
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establishment will be prepared for combat with an awareness of where it its limits in brutality 
lie when implementing force. In sum, military professionalism must be integrated with 
society, which further implies that it is dynamic in nature so that it can respond to changes in 
values and norms. The Janowitzian ideal is therefore compared to Huntington understood as a 
more controlled form of the institutionalisation of the civil-military relationship due to the 
integration of the functional and societal imperative.  
2.2 Systemising the theoretical concept  
In order to systemise the theoretical background, Huntington and Janowitz are in the 
proceeding understood as one dimension, which each theoretical understanding occupying 
one end. The Huntington-Janowitz dimension thus represents to what degree a state’s civil-
military relationship is either institutionalised closer to the Huntingtonian ideal or the 
Janowitzian ideal. From this we may understand different perceptions towards the use of 
PMCs. Huntington can be understood, based on his reliance on an autonomous military 
professionalism, as an approach towards integrating PMCs within a state’s greater military 
system, delegating the management of PMCs to levels subordinate the political leadership. 
Janowitz on the other hand represents an understanding that PMCs should not be integrated 
without concern to the societal aspect. Because of the converging civilian and military sphere, 
the use of PMCs must be institutionalised under civilian control to such an extent that a 
commitment to democratic values is not violated.  
Each particular form of understanding the institutionalisation of the privatisation of military 
functions is in essence a reflection of power distributions among the actors involved within 
the military system. It is therefore a question of control over the system. In order to interpret 
the four cases under study as either Huntingtonian or Janowitzian, we must be able to say 
something about the ideal-models control over the military system and contracted agents. For 
this, I will use Avant’s (2005) theory of effective control which is an overall measure of 
political, functional, and social control. Avant is chosen because her effective control is an 
overall measure of three indicators. The advantage of using Avant’s approach is that it can be 
connected to the basic themes in our two ideal-models. Both acknowledge political control, 
meaning the subjection of the armed services to political leadership, but whereas Huntington 
is mostly concerned with functional control, is Janowitz primarily concerned with social 
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control. Applying Avant’s three-dimensional approach allows for a nuanced categorisation of 
the cases under study, because all aspects of both theories are included.   
Avant (2005) has focused her research explicit on the consequences of privatising military 
responsibilities to PMCs. To Avant, the problem of civilian control can be captured in her 
concept of effective control. The points of departure for Avant’s research are the contradicting 
arguments from pessimists and optimist in the debate over the use of PMCs. Pessimists claim 
that the privatising of security functions threatens to undermine democratic processes. The 
legitimate use of force becomes a private rather than a public good. As a result, real security 
issues become ignored on behalf of the PMC’s profit motive. Optimists on the other hand 
argue that privatising military tasks provides governments with the most of advanced 
information technology and sophisticated weapon systems. PMCs willing to intervene in 
conflicts which constitute only minor, or no concern to governments, may become a viable 
option with little political risk. Avant’s findings of studying the empery indicate that both 
camps could be right. However, pessimists and optimist focus on different forms of control, 
thus also arguing for different outcomes. Some arguments are concerned with political 
control, that is, who gets to decide on the deployment of arms and services? Other arguments 
are worried about functional control – what kinds of capabilities are present in arms and 
services? The last category is concerned with social control – to what degree is the use of 
force integrated with international norms and standards?  
Instead of separating the different propositions, Avant incorporates them in one measure of 
effective control. The key question is how privatisation affects how these three indicators fit 
together. Effective control is therefore enhanced if the three indicators converge, and mutually 
reinforce each other. Contrary, effective control is assumed to decrease when the indicators 
diverge, creating a pull in different directions (Avant, 2005). Avant arrived at her concept of 
effective control by including different aspects of control. In this study, I reverse and 
decompose Avant’s logic in order to again be able to extract distinctive characteristics from 
each case in order to determine a Huntingtonian or Janowitzian institutionalisation.  
High effective control, i.e. when the three indicators converge, thus represents a situation 
closer to the Janowitzian understanding. Contrary, low effective control, a situation of 
divergence among the three indicators represents the Huntingtonian ideal. For the purposes of 
this study this means that effective control measures to what degree an accepted state change 
has occurred. Avant’s effective control is here understood as a dimension with the 
19 
 
Huntingtonian and Janowitzian ideal occupying each end. Please note that Huntington is not 
to be understood as state failure or as disrespect of social norms or international humanitarian 
law, but rather as a relative more autonomous institutionalisation of PMCs compared to 
Janowitz.  
The aim of this study is not to exactly pinpoint the cases, but rather to determine which end of 
the Huntington-Janowitz dimension that best reflects reality. I will return to this point in the 
following section where I incorporate the theoretical systematised concept and the 
methodological approach.  
2.3 Incorporating the systematised concept with the 
methodological approach  
The methodological approach in this paper draws on Charles Ragin’s (1987; 2000) qualitative 
comparative analysis (QCA). QCA was developed by Ragin in order to bridge the gap 
between contradicting principles of complexity and generalisation. Quantitative studies are 
not sufficiently paying attention to context. In order to arrive at valid inferences, a researcher 
may be required to observe a case’s different attributions together as a whole, and not just 
single parts of it. QCA is specifically chosen for this study because it enables the researcher to 
study several attributions of a case simultaneously, compared to other comparative methods, 
by Ragin (1987) labelled as variable oriented research, where one only focuses on one or two 
aspects of the case under study. QCA can be used to study diversity or causality.  
When using QCA, cases are viewed as configurations, and not as single cases which only 
represent one phenomenon when they are compared with each other. The key to 
understanding a case as a configuration is to see each single case as a combination of all the 
relevant attributes that it may possess. That way, one is able to make sure that a case better 
reflects its context. The next step is to find cases that are reflected in the dependent variable 
(Ragin, 2000:66).   
In this paper, each case is viewed as a configuration of political, functional, and societal 
control. Each indicator may either be coded dichotomously as high or low.6 QCA may also be 
                                                 
6 QCA labels dichotomies as ’crisp-sets’ Charles C. Ragin (2000). Fuzzy-Set Social Science. 
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used with a graded scale for the coding of indicators.7 The logic is for both methods the same 
(Ragin, 2000:91). I have however chosen to proceed with dichotomous coding because the 
primary aim within this thesis is to search for diversity, not to assess to which exact degree 
NATO-members privatise some of their military functions. The methodological implications 
following this choice will be commented further below.   
Table 1 (next page) summarises and presents the logic of the systemised theoretical concept 
and the methodological approach. With the three indicators and the dichotomous coding, a 
total number of eight (23) configurations is possible. 
Table 1. Visualising the incorporation of the systemised theoretical concept and QCA. 
 
  
 
Configuration 
 
Political 
 
Func. Control Soc. Control Y 
Janowitz 1 High High High n/a 
2 High High Low n/a 
3 High Low High n/a 
4 High Low Low n/a 
5 Low High High n/a 
6 Low High Low n/a 
7 Low Low High n/a 
Huntington 8 Low Low Low n/a 
 
These eight configurations represent what is theoretically possible. In this thesis there are only 
four cases, which implies that the outcome of the analysis only will be reflected by a 
maximum of four configurations. The arrow on the left side of table 1 represents the 
Huntington-Janowitz dimension. The closer a case is represented to configuration 1, the closer 
to the Janowitzian understanding. Contrary, a case closer to configuration 8 represents a 
Huntingtonian understanding.  
Due to the theoretical concept, there is also the possibility for interaction among indicators. 
Interaction among indicators occurs when the score on one independent indicator is dependent 
on the score of another independent indicator (Skog, 2009:300). For some of the 
configurations to occur, a state must have privatised military functions in the first place. It 
                                                 
7 QCA labels a graded scale as ’fuzzy-sets’ ibid. 
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makes no sense of speaking of reduced functional and social control as a result of privatising 
military functions to PMCs, when PMCs are not hired to perform these tasks. Political control 
is therefore a crucial factor in this regard, because for the case of democracies, the first step 
towards increased (or decreased) privatisation is a political question.   
Before we move to the next step and analyse all cases within the study in order to categorise 
the selected cases, we need to review the operationalization and specify the indicators in order 
to establish a decision-trail for the coding procedure.  
2.4 Indicators for the classification of cases 
Based on the systematised theoretical concept and the methodological design, this section 
completes the analytical instrument by further developing the tree indicators. Avant’s 
underlying logic is further supported and elaborated with the contributions from Krahmann 
(2005b) for the political and functional indicator, and Francioni & Ronzitti  (2011) for the 
social indicator.  
2.4.1 Political control 
Political control, who gets to decide on the employment of arms and services, is basically a 
question of power-relations between the actors involved in the decision-making process 
(Avant, 2005:42). Viewed from the state-centric paradigm, even moderate changes in the 
political control over force that result in a redistribution of power count as losses in control. 
Hence, political control over force varies by whether it reinforces or redistributes power 
among individuals, organisations, and institutions. In order to be able to indentify such a 
redistribution, I will rely on guidance by the theoretical approach by Krahmann (2005b). 
Krahmann (2005b) places the growing private security industry within the theoretical concept 
of the governance school, and argues that the outsourcing of military functions is only part of 
a greater emerging system of a new security policy in the post Cold War era. Krahmann 
argues that there has occurred a transformation of the North American and European security 
policy from the state-centred and bipolar structure of the Cold War, which she defines as 
government, towards a complex system of functionally different networks which include both 
public and private actors, by Krahmann defined as security governance. 
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Governance, in contrast to government, may be understood in terms of self-organising and 
inter-organised networks. Theorists of this school argue that contemporary governments lack 
the knowledge, information and competence required to solve complex political problems. 
The governance of political challenges should therefore be conceived more broadly as the 
negotiated interaction of both public and private actors, and not by state governments alone. 
This setting creates a network of interdependence and interaction among members of the 
network because boundaries between public and private become blurred, and processes of 
negotiation require a constant exchange of resources and shared purposes. These networks are 
self-regulating and often not accountable to the state because of their autonomy from the 
state. Governments may still steer public policies in a given direction, but in reality will 
policy outcomes depend on the interaction among the actors within the network over whom 
governments have little or no control (Pollack, 2005:37-38).   
The concept of governance explains the transformation of transatlantic security policy from 
the state-centred bias and bipolar structure of the Cold-War towards the more complex system 
of security governance which involves both public and private actors. Under the concept of 
security governance have the states of the transatlantic community continued to uphold 
substantial and sophisticated armed forces while at the same time privatised some of their 
security functions to private companies. The concepts of government and governance are to 
be understood as two ideal-models, and most contemporary security policy is arguably taken 
place between the two ends of the continuum (Krahmann, 2005b:250). 
Returning to the Huntington-Janowitz dimension, if a case represents a strong degree of 
government, it is understood as Janowitzian, whereas if a case represents a strong degree of 
governance it is understood as Huntingtonian. Government resembles a Janowitzian 
understanding because the state is not subject to a redistribution of power at the political level, 
leaving the impression that it is concerned with keeping all military functions closely 
integrated. Contrary, a situation of governance reduces the immediate role of the government 
in policy- making, therefore to a larger degree relying on an autonomous integration of all the 
actors involved in the governance network. Nevertheless, because all cases under study are 
democracies, it is out of the question that the political leadership has the overall lead and 
responsibility of implementing force. Therefore, a case representing a high degree of 
governance or government is therefore rather interpreted as to what extent subordinate levels 
can initiate and influence policy. A case would thus be coded as ‘low’ if subordinate levels to 
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the political leadership may initiate an increase of privatisation8 or strongly influence the 
policy process by partly or wholly formulating contract specifications in. Contrary, political 
control would be coded as ‘high’ if the political leadership has full control over the process of 
privatisation, with strong revoking mechanisms at hand, delegating only minor parts of the 
military system to the PMI.   
2.4.2 Functional control 
Functional control, what kinds of capabilities are present in the armed services, is a measure 
on the military’s ability to deploy coercion effectively to defend the state’s interests. 
Functional control therefore varies according to how effective the military agent is at 
generating military security (Avant, 2005:41). Returning to Krahmann, one of the main 
explanations for the shift towards security governance, Krahmann argues, is the replacement 
of interstate war by military, political, social and economic threats, such as terrorism, 
proliferation of civil conflicts, which challenge the ability of sovereign nation-states to ensure 
their security. As a consequence, states in the NAR increasingly recognise the resources and 
expertise of non-state actors. By progressively including non-state actors such as international 
organisations, and PMCs, a resource fragmentation occurs. Under the concept of security 
governance, functional specialisation and difference is encouraged. Consequently, functional 
resources also become fragmented due to the diversity of skills and capabilities developed by 
the different actors involved in the governance network. Under the government category, 
military resources were centralised in states and NATO. With the shift towards the 
governance category, military resources are now in addition to states and NATO fragmented 
among both public and private actors, such as NGOs (including PMCs), UN, NATO, EU, and 
OSCE (Krahmann, 2005b:250-251).  
Therefore, if a NATO-member is heavily dependent on PMCs as a consequence of 
privatisation, then functional control is to be interpreted as low, and further understood as 
Huntingtonian. It is a Huntingtonian understanding because governance arguably resembles 
the autonomous logic found in Huntington, although on a larger scale. Whereas Huntington 
leaves the functional matter in the domain of the state’s military with trust in its 
professionalism, are states whose security policy reflects a high degree of governance equally 
reliant on the professionalism of the agents in the network. Contrary, functional control is to 
                                                 
8 The first step of privatisation is under democratic rule in the hands of the government.  
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be interpreted as high when NATO-members effectively can generate military functions 
without the assistance from PMCs. High functional control arguable represents a situation 
closer to the Janowitzian understanding.  
2.4.3 Social control 
Social control is a measure to what extent a military’s use of force reflects the values and 
trends of its society, and whether the use of force is embedded within international 
humanitarian standards and the laws of war (Avant, 2005:41).  
There are arguably two aspects of social control, one implicit and one explicit. Regardless of 
explicit laws regulating the use of force, there is also an implicit aspect inherently in mankind 
that constrains human beings from unmoral behaviour, expressed through processes of 
civilisation and cultural norms, which in turn are providing the fundament for the explicit 
formulation of laws concerned with the matter.  
Regarding the adaptability of existing international human rights to the conduct of PMCs 
Francioni (2011) emphasises that ideological biases should be avoided. International human 
rights have the purpose of both to protect and constrain PMCs. They provide legal restraints 
in order to prevent abuses of power when PMCs are empowered to execute coercive services 
such as arrest and detention of prisoners of war, or persons subject to criminal prosecution, 
interrogation functions, intelligence gathering for governmental purposes, or otherwise 
participate in hostilities through the delegation of combat responsibilities. Contrary, human 
rights perform protective functions for PMC employees themselves when they operate under 
circumstances that put their life and freedom in situations of danger. 
In order to achieve a high degree of social control, both the implicit and explicit aspect has to 
be sustained. Concerning the latter, 9 Hoppe (2011) reviews the obligations of the hiring state 
                                                 
9 I will in the following rely on the sources from Francesco Francioni and Natalino Ronzitti (2011). War by 
Contract. Human Rights, Humanitarian Law, and Private Contractors., edited book which is the result of an EU 
research project focusing on the regulation of the private military industry. The research was conducted by 
eleven European universities under the lead of the European University Institute in Florence, and was launched 
in 2008 under the title “Regulating the Privatisation of War: The role of the European Union in assuring 
compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights (PRIV-WAR). The project has undertaken a 
systematic, comprehensive analysis of the role of international law in preventing abuses by private military 
contractors, in protecting them in situations of armed conflict,  and finally in providing a system of 
accountability of states and private actors in the event of harm caused by private military contractors. Their 
edited book has its main focus on the role of international human rights law (HRL), and international 
humanitarian law (IHL) in the governance of the private military industry. 
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with respect to violation of human rights a result of PMC misconduct. According to Hoppe 
are states obligated to prevent, legislate, investigate, prosecute and punish abuses of force by 
PMCs. Although different approaches have been developed by the judicial and quasi-judicial 
bodies, the final conclusion among them is clear: hiring states must take all feasible 
precautions to avoid that those PMCs who provide coercive services on their behalf violate 
the right of life of the individuals they encounter, or expose the individual to torture or other 
inhumane degrading treatment. For instance, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) states that “every human being has the inherent right to life of which he or 
she shall not be arbitrarily deprived”. The ICCPR states further that “no one shall be subjected 
to torture or to cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment” (Hoppe, 2011:112).   
The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) follows the ICCPR in a similar vein. 
Under the ACHR are obligations to prevent violations of human rights violated when a state 
fails to prevent such violations. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), and 
also the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have especially emphasised the situations 
for individuals in custody by obligating states’ parties to secure the rights of individuals under 
jurisdiction and custody. Where violations already have occurred or have been alleged, the 
IACtHR and the ECtHR further obligate hiring states the duty to provide the necessary 
structure to investigate the reporting of such allegations, and thereafter follow up and process 
the same allegations through the system of justice (Hoppe, 2011).  
The coherence among international human rights law (HRL) and international humanitarian 
law (IHL), the courts of both sides of the Atlantic, and that all NATO-members have signed 
international conventions such as the Geneva Conventions (GCs), leads to the inference that 
the societies of the four cases under study all are concerned with social control. It is therefore 
logically to assume that the legal framework of a hiring state, privatising a military function, 
thus also requires that PMCs meet the standards of national and international conventions. 
The social control indicator is therefore to be coded as high if the case under study has 
explicitly and effectively constrained and embedded the use of PMCs, and the conduct by 
PMCs in national legislation, or if use of PMCs is excluded, the empery in other ways 
indicates a high implicit concern for social control. The exclusion of PMCs is arguably a 
strong indirect statement in this regard. Contrary, social control is to be coded as low if 
national legislation does not explicitly or effectively constrain the conduct or use of PMCs, or 
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if the use of PMCs in other ways contradicts with domestic and international values and 
norms.  
To summarise, the cases in this study are to be analysed along the Huntington-Janowitz 
dimension with each understanding at either end. Three indicators, each coded as dichotomies 
determine in sum whether the case under study is closer to the Huntingtonian or Janowitzian 
understanding. Before we can begin with the analysis of the four cases under study, the 
methodological approach applied to answer the second research question needs to be 
introduced. With the analytical instrument in place, I will then proceed with analysing the 
four cases under study.  
2.5 Comments to research question 2 
So far the chapter has presented the methodological approach for solving the first research 
question. The objective of the second research question is to determine whether the empiric 
results from the analysis may affect NATO cohesion and solidarity. In order to be able to 
discuss the study’s findings in a broader perspective, the fulcrum of the discussion of the 
second research question will bandwagon with previous research of NATO.  
More specifically, the thesis will attempt to re-discuss parts of the internal NATO-debate 
concerning NATO’s internal cohesion and solidarity, but now extending the parameters of the 
debate to also include the use of PMCs as an available option. Most of the contemporary 
debate has been based on the assumption that NATO-members have only national military 
troops available. ‘Only national military troops’ is here understood in terms of that national 
contributions and burden-carrying are not entirely substituted by PMCs. For example, will 
some of the inferences change when including the possibility that PMCs could act as a 
substitute or burden-sharing valve for members who suffer from a lack of political will due 
domestic circumstances?  
The contemporary NATO-debate will be understood in the light of the research from Noetzel 
and Schreer (2009a) who have written several excellent articles on the topic. Their attempt to 
present NATO as a multi-tier system, with three diverging tiers, each representing a different 
perception on NATO’s future role in international relations is both accurate and nuanced. 
Their research is chosen to be the guideline for the discussion in this thesis because it 
effectively visualises the different perceptions among NATO-members regarding NATO’s 
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military and political role. It thereby facilitates a pattern-matching between political 
perceptions towards NATO, and political perceptions towards the use of PMCs. The objective 
is to determine whether different approaches towards the institutionalisation of PMCs further 
enhances or reduces the cleavage among NATO-members.   
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3 Privatisation patterns 
This chapter analyses the four cases under study. The following sections will present the case 
of the US, the UK, Germany and Norway respectively. Each case is unique due empirical 
realities. Two of the cases are actively using PMCs to perform coercive services, whereas two 
cases use PMCs only for non-coercive services. The analysis is therefore approaching each 
case slightly differently in order to extract data which reflect a cases’ institutionalization of its 
civil-military relationship. The cases are analyzed relative to each other and not against an 
exogenously given standard. A case assigned the value ‘high’, is thus to be interpreted as high 
relative to the other cases under study. Caution is further advised in regard to the 
methodological design. Due to the dichotomous coding the research design does not capture 
differences within the ‘high’ or ‘low’ category. Two cases which both are assigned a high on 
one of the indicators could have been described more accurately and nuanced if there also was 
a ‘medium’ value which contrasted the two. Comments in this regard will be presented in this 
chapter’s concluding section.  
3.1 USA 
This section applies the thesis’ analytical tool to the case of the US.  The analysis will 
systematically proceed through the indicators of political, functional and social control. The 
US represents in many ways the extreme case when it comes to the privatisation of military 
functions. The US has, compared to other NATO-members, introduced PMCs to supplement 
and support its military to the largest extent. The US and US PMCs are also overrepresented 
in the media due to many controversies that have followed in the wake of PMCs under 
contract with the US, with the Abu Grahib scandal in 2004 and the Blackwater shooting in 
Bagdad in 2007, killing 14, as the most famous of the many incidents that have been reported. 
But also in Afghanistan has the use of PMCs hired by the US reached the news headlines.  
The analysis will be based on primary sources from the US Department of Defence (DoD) 
and reports to the issue formulated by different parliamentary or governmental scrutiny 
services such as the Congressional Research Service (CRS) or Government Accountability 
Office (GAO). The focus here is on PMCs which are hired to perform a military function. 
Because this thesis is primarily concerned with PMC supplementing or even substituting 
public military forces, this thesis does not distinguish on whether other departments than the 
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DoD, such as the US State Department are hiring PMCs. Rather the analysis is applied to all 
cases were PMCs are hired to perform military functions for their clients which otherwise 
would have been performed by US soldiers. These criteria do also apply to the other three 
cases under study.  
Political control, to what extent subordinate levels to the political leadership are authorised to 
engage the hiring of and further management of contracted PMCs is the first indicator. As 
with the other cases, it is out of the question that the political leadership has the full 
responsibility over the implementation of force to a given contingency mission. For the case 
of the US, subordinate levels have however been delegated significant hiring and 
management competencies, indicating a Huntingtonian institutionalisation of PMCs.  
According to the DoD Instruction for “Private Security Contractors Operating in Contingency 
Operations”,  which establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides procedures for 
the regulation of the selection, accountability, training, equipping, and the conduct of PMCs 
under contract with the US, the responsibility of the entire contracting process, from hiring, 
management and termination is at the department level institutionalised among six agencies 
(U.S Department of Defence, 2009:5-6). The US Armed Forces joint doctrine for the 
integration of operational contract support further delegates responsibility among 12 different 
Service commanders and the staffs related to operational contract support (U.S Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2008:xi-xii). However, many of these agencies are only responsible for contractual and 
administrative oversight. The operational responsibility concerning the integration of PMCs 
with the military lies mainly with the Geographic Combatant Commanders in whose area of 
responsibility a contingency operation is occurring. Geographic Combatant Commanders 
shall in accordance with current doctrine and regulation:  
“Provide guidance and procedures, as necessary and consistent with the principles 
established [...] for the selection, training accountability, and equipping of such PSC 
personnel and the conduct of PSCs and PSC personnel within their area of responsibility. 
Individual training and qualification standards set by the geographic Combatant 
Commander, shall meet, at a minimum, one of the Military Departments’ established 
standards [...]” (U.S Department of Defence, 2009).  
Regional Combatant Commanders are also delegated the responsibility to issue permissions 
for PMC personnel to carry weapons, and under what circumstances a weapon may be 
discharged. In sum, these responsibilities are arguable very close to the responsibilities in 
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regard to the military. The point is that the use and integration of PMCs is to a large extent 
embedded at levels subordinate to the US political leadership. Military commands and 
commanders are given the necessary competences to include PMC into the larger military 
system in order to achieve its designated ends. The current doctrine therefore reflects a 
Huntingtonian understanding relying on autonomous military professionalism. In US General 
David Patraeus’ words, stated at a memorandum to commanders, PMC personnel, soldiers 
and civilians in Afghanistan in 2010: “contracting has to be a commander’s business” (CRS 
Report for Congress, 2011b:19). 
Regarding the functional indicator, the US can both be said to be the weakest and strongest 
case relative to the other three. On the one hand, the US is the least dependent on PMCs for 
generating security given its enormous public military, which as of today is second to none. 
However, such an argument requires a more nuanced understanding. Although the US may 
possess the strongest firepower, both in conventional and nuclear weapons, it has nevertheless 
privatised huge parts of its logistical military functions, thereby arguably reducing its overall 
firepower because it cannot implement its full strength and size without the inclusion of 
PMCs. Also when it comes to coercive services does the US increasingly rely on PMCs. 
According to US government officials, both the DoD and Department of State would be 
unable to execute their mission in Iraq and Afghanistan without the support of PMCs (Avant, 
2005:115; CRS Report for Congress, 2011a:5).10  
The following numbers can aid in illustrating these arguments. Under the US Central 
Command area of responsibility, which covers the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US 
has approximately 176,000 PMC personnel under contract, compared to its approximately 
209,000 uniformed personnel. For the specific case of Afghanistan, as of December 2010, 
there were 70,599 PMC personnel compared to approximately 96,900 US troops (CRS Report 
for Congress, 2011b:9). Of the 70,599 PMC personnel, as of December 2010, 18,919 PMC 
personnel were providing coercive services (CRS Report for Congress, 2011a:5). These 
numbers are to a large extent under-communicated by the media, therefore giving a false 
impression of on actual US effort. Moreover, from June 2009 to October 2010, 319 PMC 
personnel have been killed in action compared to 626 US troops killed over the same time 
                                                 
10 This thesis assesses NATO-members institutionalisation of PMCs. Data drawn from a non NATO-operations 
are therefore perceived as still valid, because the institutionalisation of PMCs is assumed to be a political process 
independent of whether a mission is conducted in the name of NATO or not. These criteria apply to all four 
cases. 
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period. Adjusting for the difference in the number of PMC personnel compared to US military 
troops, a PMC employee is 2.75 times more likely to be killed in action compared to 
uniformed personnel (CRS Report for Congress, 2011a:9).  
US functional control is therefore remarkably reduced given the heavy reliance on PMCs. 
First, because PMC personnel make up approximately 45 percent11 of the total force that the 
US has deployed under the Central Command, and 42 percent12 of the total force in 
Afghanistan. These numbers would have been substituted by US troops should the US 
provide the same effort without PMCs. Second, PMC personnel casualties are arguably 
reducing the number of killed US troops, consequently blurring the actual brutality of the war. 
Also, an increase in US troops to perform the work which is now in the hands of PMC is 
unlikely given the stark domestic opposition to increase US troops numbers abroad. The 
“surge” to Iraq, providing an additional 30,000 US troops in 2007, and the “surge” to 
Afghanistan in 2009, providing an additional 17,000 US troops, were both subject to fierce 
debate in the US Congress. For the case of Afghanistan, how will Washington be able to fill 
in the theoretical remaining spots, now occupied by 50,000 PMC personnel, required to reach 
the US total force contribution, PMCs included?   
The heavy reliance and dependence on PMCs can therefore be interpreted as a Huntingtonian 
understanding because, as will be emphasised under social control, the US case gives the 
impression that PMCs are hired to fill in gaps that US forces cannot fill by simply integrating 
PMCs in accordance with the US military. Moreover, the heavy reliance on PMC further 
reduces the ability of US forces to generate security. Therefore, the US case is interpreted as 
low functional control.  
Social control, to what extent the use of force is embedded in social norms and values, 
institutionalised by IHL and by IHR, is the third and final indicator. According the US Armed 
Forces doctrine for operational contract support, are all PMC personnel who are authorised to 
accompany the force and provide services in the coercive domain protected by law in 
accordance with IHL, IHR and GCs. They are according to US doctrine further defined as 
non-combatants, but eligible to prisoner of war status should they be detained by enemy 
forces. The US War Crimes Act of 1996, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 
2000, and the US Patriot Act of 2001, all further open for the prosecution of PMC personnel 
                                                 
11 Author’s calculation: 17600/ (17600+209000) = 0.45. 
12 Author’s calculation: 70599/ (70599+96900) = 0.42 
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who have committed war crimes or violated IHL and IHR. The Federal Anti-Torture Statute 
and the Uniform Code of Military Justice also opens for the prosecution of PMC conduct, 
hence further embedding PMC’s use of force into social values and norms (U.S Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, 2008:IV-5 - IV-6).  
In effect, legislative measurements to constrain the conduct of PMCs are explicit stated in US 
doctrine, leading towards the impression that the use of force is under social control as we 
defined it here. However, both part of the legislature and empirical evidence indicate 
concerns. First, the doctrine for operational contract support opens for the possibility for 
caveats through the ‘Status of Forces Agreements’. These are international agreements 
between two or more governments that address various privileges and immunities of 
individual members of a deployed force, and can be used, although rarely, to define PMC 
personnel who accompany the force legal status’ (U.S Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008:IV-5). 
Moreover, the US also emphasises that only the prime contractor, that is a contract entered 
directly by the US with a PMC, has a direct legal responsibility. Any subcontractors the same 
PMC may engage have no legal relationship to the US (U.S Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008:I-6). 
Although the legislation in regard to IHL, IHR and the US federal laws still applies, the US 
can again be interpreted as applying a Huntingtonian approach, relying on the autonomous 
military structure and professionalism. Support to this argument can further be found in 
numerous reports from the GAO and Congressional hearings. In January 2009, Secretary of 
Defence Robert Gates testified in a hearing to the US committee on Armed Services that 
PMC personnel were used: 
“without any supervision or without any coherent strategy on how we were going to 
do it and without conscious decisions about what we will allow contractors to do and what we 
won’t allow contractors to do [...] and those are the areas that I think especially we need to 
focus on first” (U.S Congress Hearing, 2009:44). 
Moreover, the State Department has also been accused of taking democratic shortcuts. On 
several occasions has the State Department pushed for a “sizeable payment” and an “apology” 
rather than legal prosecution when PMC personnel under contract with the US have severely 
violated international conventions on human rights. Especially the case of Iraq indicates a 
modus operandi were the focus was to “put the matter behind us” rather than to insist upon 
accountability (Democratic Majority Staff, 2007:2; 9). 
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War crimes and other violations of IHL and IHR have apparently occurred to such an extent 
that several reports indicate that the use of PMCs has in many situations worked counter-
productive towards US counter-insurgency strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan (CRS Report for 
Congress, 2011a; CRS Report for Congress, 2011b; Democratic Majority Staff, 2007). This 
again arguably also affects functional control negatively. In sum, although US federal law to a 
large extent is concerned with PMC conduct in regard to social norms and values, the data 
indicates a lack of sufficient institutionalisation of social control. The US is therefore assigned 
the value of ‘low’ for the indicator of social control.  
The case of the US can in total be summed up by low political control, low functional control, 
and low social control. The US is therefore best interpreted by a Huntingtonian 
understanding. 
3.2 United Kingdom 
This section analyses the case of the UK. Whereas the US represents the extreme case overall, 
the UK represents the extreme case confined to the European context. UK PMCs have been 
leading in the development of the PMI, and London is by many observers seen as one of the 
main centres for the PMI as whole. Regarding contemporary military operations such as Iraq, 
the British government is relying on two UK PMCs for the protection of diplomatic and 
humanitarian personnel. UK PMC Aegis has also received one of the biggest contracts 
concerned with the rebuilding of Iraq, including the provision of coercive services such as 
intelligence gathering (Halvorsen, 2005). The following analysis is based primarily on peer 
reviewed secondary sources which have conducted similar analysis of the UK for other 
research projects. The secondary sources used have extensively covered UK official 
documents and the academic literature on the field.  
The UK has since the Thatcher administration from the 1980s been the frontrunner of 
privatisation in Europe. Also succeeding Labour governments have continued and further 
progressively developed this trend. British governments have from the start aimed for a 
market-oriented approach with the purpose of extracting as much expertise from the private 
sector in producing military functions at the lowest possible price. Given the non-coercive 
services that were privatised at the start of this development, the exclusive reliance on 
contractual relationships has ever since been perceived as justified, unproblematic, and well 
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regulated (Halvorsen, 2005:358; Krahmann, 2005a:280). The general perception among 
policy-makers in the UK has to this regard been that governmental involvement in the PMI is 
to be understood as an interference which would hinder free market competition. Hence, 
PMCs are intended to be viewed as partners with an equal input on how services are provided. 
As a result, there are more than 40 different agencies under the British Ministry of Defence 
(MoD) which either have procurement or supply roles in order to achieve a highest possible 
degree of a simulated free market (Halvorsen, 2005).  
Public Private Partnerships (PPP) were introduced in 1997 with the purpose of further 
modernisation of the British military. A core element of PPP is the Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI) program. Under PFI private capital is invited to bid on the procurement, construction, 
and maintenance, of British military facilities which the MoD then buys or rents from the 
PMC in return (Halvorsen, 2005:328). Under the PPP/PFI programme, the MoD has to a large 
extent relied on PMC for the training of crews for key military functions such as attack and 
medium sized transport helicopters, Hawk and Tornado fighter jets, strategic airlift, Astute-
class submarines, and by 2016 the entire air tanker fleet (Air Tanker, 2011; Hartley & 
MacDonald, 2010:52; Krahmann, 2005a:280). This indicates a serious dependence on private 
expertise in order to train crews who are vital to the military systems ability to generate 
security. Also, the MoD may find it very hard to opt out of such contracts because with PPP 
/PFI expertise and ownership of military service facilities remain on the hands of the PMC in 
the case of contract termination. This further increases the dependence in the short term 
because the MoD may have a hard time finding substitutes for the PMCs currently on contract 
who have sufficient expertise and facilities available (Krahmann, 2005a:282). The UK is also 
subject to other inefficiencies and agency problems in relation to active contracts. A recent 
report from the National Audit Office (2010) concluded that the strategic air to air refuelling 
project has been five years delayed, putting an extra pressure on the current aging Royal Air 
Force fleet, and further hinders the MoD to achieve value for its money. 
Regarding political and functional control, the UK is certainly leaning towards a low degree 
of control. The many subordinate MoD-agencies, and the otherwise broad integration of the 
PMI and the broader defence industry has subjected the MoD to a redistribution of influence 
to the policy process and a further loss of its monopoly when it comes to initiating policy. The 
underlying logic to this argument is that the more agents in a principal-agent relationship, the 
more incentive the agent has to progressively advocate and expand his role in order not to lose 
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their influence on the principal.13 In terms of its ability to generate security, the British 
military is arguably also highly dependent on PMCs. Not only for training, but also for the 
delivery of key military functions such as strategic air to air refuelling. In sum, the findings 
from the data indicate a Huntingtonian approach towards the institutionalisation of PMCs 
given the heavy reliance on contracts, and external expertise influencing both political and 
functional control. 
Regarding social control, the data indicates ambiguous results. The Private Security Act from 
2001 includes a number of regulations designed to constrain and regulate the PMI. These 
regulations apply however only within the UK. As soon as a British PMC operates outside 
UK jurisdiction, different foreign national law applies. The Act also fails to address services 
related to strategic training, military logistics and management (Krahmann, 2005a:287). The 
drafting of the British Green Paper “Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation”, 
and its discussion in the Ninth Report of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 
readdresses some of the problems not covered by previous legislation (Foreign Affairs 
Comittee, 2002; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2002). The advocated approach in these 
reports is an increased national registration and licensing of PMC. However, as of 2005, these 
legislative proposals had not been ratified (Krahmann, 2005a:288).  
Nevertheless, the UK has been very cautious in regard to the scope of services PMCs may 
perform. Although the MoD has had great trust in PMCs for the training of military 
personnel, it still relies fully on its own officers for the operation and command of strategic 
assets. For instance, although PMC Air Tanker will provide aircraft, material, and the services 
that follow, Royal Air Force pilots will command the air tankers on military missions (Air 
Tanker, 2011). The MoD is also aware of the juridical implications which are connected to 
the provision of coercive services by PMCs. Current doctrine therefore strictly demarcates 
PMC personnel’s area of operation to explicit defined ‘benign areas’. These benign areas are 
demarcated by a ‘benign edge’. All work beyond the benign edge is to be executed by UK 
military personnel. Such a theoretical delegation of work has however proven to be difficult 
in reality because of the ever blurring distinction between support services and coercive 
services provided by PMCs and military personnel. As a consequence of the ever more 
diminishing distinctions, the UK took steps to introduce its Sponsored Reserves concept, 
                                                 
13 For a review of the organisational literature relevant to this argument see: William A. Jr. Niskanen (2007). 
Bureaucracy and Representative Government. 
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which was already introduced in 1998. It is designed to enable PMC personnel to provide 
military functions to the UK military by enrolling them as voluntary Sponsored Reserves. 
While serving as Sponsored Reserves, PMC personnel are subject to the Service Discipline 
Acts and other Service regulations (Halvorsen, 2005:340-343).  
Whereas the US has more actively introduced PMCs to provide coercive services to its 
contingency operations abroad, the UK has to a larger extend relied on PMCs for training at 
home. This indicates that the UK is concerned about violations by PMC acting on its behalf. 
Relatively to the US, the UK has also to a greater extent explicitly stated and broadened the 
scope of its policy regarding social integration of force. Therefore, although the UK scores a 
‘low’ on political and functional control, it is assigned a ‘high’ on social control.  
3.3 Germany 
German policy is emphasising that privatisation is limited to services of non-strategic 
relevance and non-coercive services (Krahmann, 2005a:284). The current government has 
clearly stated that PMCs providing coercive services are not hired. For its current operation in 
Afghanistan,  the Federal Ministry of Defence (FMoD) has hired PMCs exclusively for the 
provision of support services such as canteens and construction (Deutscher Bundestag, 
2010:6-7). Because Germany does not use PMCs to provide coercive or other strategically 
relevant services, it neither does have specific regulation to this regard like for example the 
US has. The PMI is nevertheless increasingly entangled in German security policy, arms and 
weapon system procurement, and non-coercive support services. In order to analyse the case 
of Germany, this thesis will look at other junctures of public and private cooperation in order 
to extract data which can give an indication of German policy towards the PMI. In particular, 
Krahmann (2005a:278) identifies two mechanisms intervening in the governance of the PMI 
and the broader security policy which can be used as fruitful aides in the analysing process.  
The first mechanism is governmental regulation which includes the legislative framework for 
the national provision of private military functions to the greater military system. The second 
mechanism is public-private partnership, including privatisation, joint ventures, and state 
shareholdings in the defence sector. Although indirect, these perspectives can be used to 
interpret Germany’s political and functional control. The analysis relies on primary sources 
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such as parliamentary documents, and secondary sources which have done previous research 
on Germany’s relationship to the PMI.  
According to the Federal Ministry of Defence (FMoD) White Paper (Bundesministerium der 
Verteidigung, 2006:79), concerning the security policy for Germany and the future for the 
German Armed Forces, the intention of the German Armed Forces is to focus on its core 
functions, while functions which can be provided by the private sector at  lower costs shall be 
privatised in cooperation with the German military.  
Germany has institutionalised the options for public-private cooperation in the FMoD-agency 
Bundesamt für Wehrtechnik und Beschaffung (BWB) and in a private company, with full 
Government ownership, the Gesellshaft für Entwicklung, Beschaffung und Betrieb (GEBB). 
The latter is responsible for services and functions were it is not perceived as essential that 
they are provided by German Armed Forces personnel. The non-military car park for 
administrative purposes and the manufacturing of uniforms are the two primary services 
institutionalised at the GEBB (GEBB, 2010:7).  All contracting for services more closely 
related to the military function itself are to be channelled centrally through the BWB. Central 
procurement means that the entire demand of the armed services is jointly determined and 
procured. The purpose is to create a competitive environment which benefits the German 
Armed Forces in terms of a lower price (Bundesamt für Wehrtechnik und Beschaffung, 
2010).  
Germany planned to introduce market principles to the German Armed Forces as early as 
1994, but has however been very careful in regard to thereafter following developments. The 
German government has during the process of privatisation aimed at full or partial ownership 
of those PMCs which are providing services to its armed forces. The Framework Agreement 
“Innovation, Investment and Efficiency”, introduced in 1999, assigns the German Armed 
Forces with ownership of military assets, while PMCs may take over associated services such 
as management, operation and training. As of 2005, two projects have been implemented with 
success. The first is the training of Eurofighter pilots and ground crew. However, unlike the 
case of the UK, which uses the same PMC to train their pilots, the German Air Force only 
hired PMC personnel to train the first rounds of pilots designated for the new fighter jet. 
Subsequent classes of pilots were to be trained by the pilots who successfully completed the 
first training rounds. The second successful project was the military’s land-warfare special 
training facility. Yet also here was the advanced training under strict rule of the German 
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military, whereas support functions were privatised. In effect, the FMoD has been very aware 
of becoming dependent on a single PMC providing a crucial service. Rather, it has maintained 
full or partial ownership to ensure functional control in order to be able to generate security. 
The public-private partnership enables the German Armed Forces to exert immediate control 
over PMCs and the services they provide. The aim is to not only to prevent long term 
dependence on a single contractor but also to ensure that continued cooperation is based on 
the satisfaction of the FMoD (Krahmann, 2005a:282-285).  
In effect, the political and functional indicators for the case of Germany can be best explained 
with the Janowitzian understanding which emphasises an integrated understanding of civil-
military relations. It becomes clear that as of today, the German political leadership is very 
aware of becoming trapped in agency-problems related to PMCs. Germany is therefore 
interpreted as high on political and functional control.  
Because the FMoD abstains from the use of PMCs, it consequently also has less challenges 
regarding social control. Germany is arguably one of the most sensitive states in the world 
when it comes to the embedment of force into social values and norms, given its historic 
legacy. Nevertheless, Germany is not unaffected of the growth of the PMI, and the German 
national assembly is very concerned about the wider developments of the PMI. For instance, 
German PMCs which educate security personnel for airports etc. have arranged contacts to 
US PMCs who then have employed Germans for service in Iraq and Afghanistan.  As a result, 
several Germans, often with former employment in the German Armed Forces, have been 
killed or wounded while under contract for US PMCs (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010).  
Although we cannot directly measure Germany’s institutionalisation of social control towards 
the use of PMCs because the FMoD does not use PMCs for coercive services, one can still 
induct inferences of Germany’s relationship to social control by analysing perceptions among 
members of parliament. German members of parliament have on several occasions raised 
questions regarding both national and international legislation in regard to the PMI (see for 
example: Deutscher Bundestag, 2008; 2010; 2011). This indicates that even though Germany 
has not been privatising coercive military functions, its public, represented by its national 
parliament, is widely concerned with the matter. Especially the legal status of PMCs and the 
right to use force by their employees is under focus by members of parliament. Also, the 
avoidance of using PMCs is arguably a strong indirect statement in regard to state control 
over all forms of the use of force. As a result, Germany is assigned ‘high’ on social control, 
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thereby scoring ‘high’ on all indicators relative to the US and the UK. Germany’s 
institutionalisation of PMCs is therefore categorised as Janowitzian. The next section presents 
the case of Norway, before the final section summarises the analysis.  
3.4 Norway 
Norway is the fourth and final case under study in this analysis. As with Germany, Norway 
has so far been careful with the privatisation of coercive services and military functions. The 
analysis will therefore also here rely on governmental regulations and public private 
partnerships as aides in order to extract data that can be interpreted by the analytical tool. The 
analysis is based on primary sources such as parliamentary documents, and secondary sources 
who have dealt with the Norwegian case during research projects focusing on public private 
partnership for the Norwegian defence sector. The analysis will proceed subsequently through 
the three analytical indicators. 
Public private partnership (OPP [Offentlig Privat Partnerskap]) is the Norwegian equivalent 
to the UK’s PPP. There is however a huge difference. Whereas the case of the UK was 
strongly influenced and motivated by ideology, the Norwegian case is according to official 
policy better understood as one of many means of the ongoing modernisation process that the 
Norwegian military is currently subject to (Stortinget, 2006-2007a).  
OPP consists of three parts. The first is ‘privatising’ where whole or parts of the Norwegian 
military’s functions are privatised to one of several external suppliers in the form of PMCs, 
with the obligation that privatised military functions are provided in return. The second form 
is partnering, a form of contracting with a reciprocal pledge between the Norwegian Ministry 
of Defence (NMoD) and the contract partner to supply and demand each other’s services. In 
the case of partnering, the NMoD is most often responsible for the entire financing of the 
project, yet financing may also be partly provided be the private sector.  This is however the 
exception. The third form is public private cooperation (OPS [Offentlig Privat Samarbeid]). 
OPS is a form of cooperation between the NMoD and the PMI where in contrast to 
partnering, private financing is carrying the main burdens of the project. The NMoD is in 
return obligated to buy or rent the provided service or facility. The NMoD is however very 
cautious about becoming dependent on the private sector. The use of OPS will only be 
considered if the PMI can provide a given service to a lower price than the NMoD can on its 
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own. Hence, alternative financing is not a justified motive by itself (Forsvarsdepartementet, 
2005:9).  
Norway has approached OPP with one step at a time. Norwegian official policy states that; 
“during the further modernisation of the Norwegian military, it is the intention of the 
government to prioritise internal efficiency before privatising becomes an option” (Author's 
translation, Stortinget, 2007-2008:141). Even military functions such operational logistic 
support, which for instance is privatised widely by the UK, are preferred to be produced 
within the military establishment (Stortinget, 2007-2008:141). The NMoD is also strongly 
influencing contract designs. Every new contract is subject to strict evaluations regarding 
important factors such as cost, contract duration and specifications of the product that is to be 
delivered (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2005). Although there have been some implications and 
concerns during the NMoD evaluation phases, and also with the delivery of two major 
projects (Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet, 2005; Olsen, 2008), two academic studies (Bjone, 
2008; Frydenlund, 2007), and official parliamentary scrutiny (Stortinget, 2006-2007b:10) 
conclude that for the OPP in general, operational requirements have been met, and that the 
NMoD has maintained leadership and control over its projects.  
The political leadership in Norway also recognises the importance of the Norwegian military 
establishment within the rest of the Norwegian society and industry. The overreaching 
strategy by NMoD is therefore to integrate the two. Both in order to develop defence related 
businesses and industries within Norway, and to ensure the military’s access to necessary 
competence, services and material (Stortinget, 2006-2007a).   
Therefore, regarding political control, the NMoD is clearly in the driving seat. It both has the 
initiative, and sets the terms and conditions. Compared to the UK, for instance, government 
leadership is not perceived as an interference with free market principles. Representatives 
from the PMI are of course invited and encouraged to present their ideas in order to be able to 
exploit the comparative advantage in competences which can be found in the PMI, yet the 
initiative rests with the NMoD. Hence, Norway is coded ‘high’ on the political indicator.  
When it comes to functional control, Norway is arguably equally restrictive, yet 
generalisations and conclusions should not be drawn to hastily. The data indicates a two-
folded picture. Regarding the use of PMCs to provide coercive services, Norwegian policy 
strictly forbids such actions. The provision of coercive or combatant services as it is 
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formulated by the NMoD is the exclusive domain of the Norwegian military 
(Forsvarsdepartementet, 2005:4). Yet, when it comes the training of coercive services, PMCs 
have been hired. Moreover, interviews with NMoD officials indicate a contradicting attitude 
to the views of the political leadership. It seems that the internal establishment at the NMoD 
values many of the competences which can be found in the PMI, advocating a high degree of 
quality. These contradictions are arguably first and foremost a result of unclear internal 
working definitions of what is to be viewed as the Norwegian military’s core competencies, 
rather than disloyalty (Olsen, 2008:28-29).  
A second reason to the NMoD relative greater acceptance may be of purely pragmatic 
reasons. The Norwegian military, and especially the Army, is experiencing a gap between 
provided funds and political ambitions. As a result, many former competences have been 
eroded with the result that the military is looking to the PMI for training expertise. Over 30 
PMCs have as of 2008 been providing military training to the Norwegian military so that it 
can meet its operational standards (Olsen, 2008:37-38). This clearly leads towards the 
indication that the Norwegian military indeed is dependent on PMCs in order to meet its 
functional training standards. However, the Norwegian case of dependence is a result of 
politically initiated military downsizing and not a political initiative for privatisation, as is the 
case in the UK and US.14 For the case of Norway, PMCs are actually increasing its ability to 
generate security because the military does not possess the sufficient resources to train its 
soldiers. Because Norwegian reliance is a resource problem, and not a result of politically 
motivated privatisation which is the focus in this thesis, and that official policy constrains the 
use of PMCs to only provide military training, Norway is still assigned a high on functional 
control.  
Finally, when it comes to social control, the NMoD is also on this aspect very cautious 
regarding coercive services. Compared to the US, which for instance to a very large extent has 
used PMC for logistic transport protection, the aim of NMoD is to avoid any situations where 
civilians may become targeted by military warfare (Olsen, 2008:36). An incident regarding 
the Norwegian PMC Ronin, indicates that also the Norwegian public is very concerned and 
aware of the consequences in relation to the privatising of strategic military functions. Ronin 
was engaged by the military to provide coercive services training for military personnel who 
                                                 
14 For further information to the modernisation of the Norwegian Armed Forces see: Sverre Diesen (2011). 
Fornyelse eller forvitring? Forsvaret mot 2020., Ragnvald H. Solstrand (2005). Offentlig-Privat Partnerskap i 
det nye Forsvaret. 
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were scheduled for deployment to Afghanistan. The public however was widely unaware of 
these arrangements, resulting in harsh public critique when the media uncovered the 
circumstances in the winter of 2008. In response, the NMoD immediately put the Ronin- , and 
all other similar contracts on a temporary hold (Olsen, 2008:28). This indicates that Norway, 
both its official leadership, and the public are concerned about social embedment of the use of 
force.  
Norway is therefore assigned the value of high on social control. In sum, Norway scores a 
high on all three indicators, placing the case at the Janowitzian end. The next section 
summarizes the analysis for all four cases, and comments methodological delimitations that 
have influenced the coding of cases before an inference to the first research question is drawn.  
3.5 Summary; answering research question 1 
Returning to the QCA logic applied in the thesis, the four cases can be summed up in table 2. 
Given the research designs eight possible configurations, three of the configurations are 
reflected in the data by the four cases under study. Germany and Norway were coded as high 
on all three variables, represented by configuration number 1, thereby clearly falling towards 
the Janowitzian understanding. The US represents the complete opposite, represented by 
configuration 8 scoring low on all three indicators and hence falling towards the 
Huntingtonian understanding. The UK is represented by configuration 7. The results are 
summarized in table 2 on the next page. 
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The result of the analysis may be expressed with small and capital letters and Boolean 
algebra. With each indicator represented by its first letter, P, F, and S, small and capital letters 
represent the values ‘low’ and ‘high’ of the indicators respectively. The results from table 2 
can therefore be expressed as: Y = PFS + PFS  + pfS + pfs. Boolean addition “+” is 
understood as ‘or’, while Boolean multiplication “*” means ‘and’ (PFS = P * F* S) (Ragin, 
2000:84). Because Germany and Norway are reflected by the same configuration, PFS, the 
results can be shortened to Y = PFS + pfS + pfs, representing Germany and Norway, the UK, 
and the US respectively.  
Three comments need to be made in order to arrive at a valid inference. The first comment is 
in regard to the stark contrasting of the results, i.e. that all cases are represented at either end 
of the Huntington-Janowitz dimension, and none by the middle configurations such as 4 and 
5. This clustering can be explained by interaction among indicators, due to the theoretical 
concept. In order to achieve consistency between the theoretical concept and its 
operationalization, each end of the Huntington-Janowitz dimension must necessarily be 
reflected by opposite values of the indicators. In effect, this leads to a theoretical pre-
determination of the coding of cases, because the cases under study are analysed and weighted 
against the theoretical background, which in turn explains the clustering at either end. A 
crucial factor to this regard is the political indicator. The institutionalisation of a states civil-
military relationship is in essence a political question. Therefore, if the political leadership is 
exchanged through elections, new normative understandings concerning the civil-military 
relationship may surface, and change the institutionalisation of force. From a theoretical 
perspective, if the political discourse changes from a Huntingtonian to a Janowitzian 
Table 2. Presenting the results of the analysis. 
 
 Configuratio
 
 
Political Control Func. Control Soc. Control Y 
Janowitz 
 
1 High High High GER, NOR 
2 High High Low n/a 
3 High Low High n/a 
4 High Low Low n/a 
5 Low High High n/a 
6 Low High Low n/a 
7 Low Low High UK 
Huntington 8 Low Low Low US 
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understanding, would not only the political indicator switch from ‘low’ to ‘high’, but also the 
two other indicators would in principle inevitably have to change, in order to be consistent 
with the theoretical concept. The coding of cases is therefore very sensitive to time and 
character. If we would have applied the same research design to the same cases 20 years 
earlier or 10 years later we would most likely have coded them differently. The results of the 
analysis must therefore be seen against this backdrop.  
The second comment is in regard to the number of cases under study. Four cases cannot 
sufficiently represent all the 28 NATO-members. Especially East European NATO-members 
have the potential of representing an additional middle pattern, plausibly clustering around 
configuration 4, given the economic and social turmoil as a result of the “Washington 
Consensus” during the first decade of post Cold-War era, which left many East European 
states strong in terms of political control, yet weak on functional and social control. This 
comment will be further elaborated under the overall assessment of the research design during 
the discussion of the analysis’ results. As of now, it must be recognised that because of the 
limited number of cases under study, broad generalisations must be drawn with caution.  
The third comment is in regard to the research designs lack of a more precisely grading scale. 
Adcock and Collier (2001:529) emphasise the importance of measurement validity in social 
research. Measurement validity is an assessment of how well the operationalization and 
coding of cases reflect the concept the researcher has under study. Measurement validity thus 
distinguishes itself from validity which is concerned with causal inference. Measurement 
validity is especially important for the research design in this MA thesis because the empirical 
study is primarily concerned with detecting diversity and not causal relationships / 
mechanisms. The relationship between a study’s background concept and its observations 
consists according to Adcock and Collier of four levels. The first is the background concept 
itself, which encompasses the contemporary contextual and current research background 
associated with the given concept. Second is the systematized level which captures the more 
systematised theoretical concept from which working assumptions are drawn. The third level 
involves the operationalization of the theoretical concept and any systematic scoring 
procedure. Finally, the fourth level consists of the scores for, or classifications of cases. 
Measurement validity thus involves the interaction among levels two to four, and is valid 
when the scores in level four, derived from level three, can meaningfully be interpreted in the 
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terms of the systematized concept, level two (Adcock & Collier, 2001:530-531). In essence, 
what can the particular methodological approach not capture? 
The present design does not capture variations within high or low control on any of the three 
indicators. The results may therefore lead to false impressions because diversity among cases 
which score the same value on same the indicator is not reflected. For instance, both the UK 
and Germany score ‘high’ on social control, yet as this analysis has shown, high social control 
in the UK is not the same as high social control in Germany, nor compared to Norway. Yet 
compared to the US, it is arguably justified to assign the UK a high for social control. This 
methodological problem could have been solved by introducing a ‘medium’ value. However, 
three indicators with three values would have complicated the analytical design to such an 
extent that it would have interfered with this thesis aim of a parsimonious presentation of the 
diversity among those NATO-members under study. 15 Nevertheless, in order to overcome 
these methodological considerations, the following comments to the results are required to 
present a valid description.  
As already noted, the UK’s high value of social control is best understood as ‘medium’ 
compared to the other three cases. Regarding political control, all members are democracies, 
placing the overall responsibility with the sitting government. The contrast between the US 
and the UK on one side, and Germany and Norway on the other is arguably justified as fair 
description, although the US is more extreme than the UK. Finally, functional control is the 
indicator which to the largest extent hides differences. The US scores a low because PMCs 
are to such a large extent providing the provision of coercive services to US operations. The 
UK is also assigned a low value, yet primarily because of its extensive reliance in the training 
of military functions. Germany and Norway are assigned a high on functional control. Yet 
Germany can be argued to focus even more on functional control given its policy so far to 
only rely on external expertise to train first generation crews for the new weapon systems, 
whereas Norway has used external expertise on an ongoing basis.    
Based on the results from the analysis, this means that the use of PMCs among the cases 
under study is either institutionalized as Janowitzian, with ‘high’ political, functional and 
social control (Germany and Norway), or as Huntingtonian with ‘low’ political, functional 
and social control (the US). A third pattern is represented by the UK, with its ‘low’ political 
                                                 
15  Three indicators, with three values would have given 33 = 27 configurations.  
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and functional control leading towards the Huntington end, yet not as extreme as the US when 
it comes to social control. In order to answer the thesis first research question, one can draw 
the inference, seen in the light of the civil-military relations literature, that three patterns of 
policy standards towards the use of PMCs are present among NATO-members. This means 
that there are in indeed differences among NATO-members when it comes to the 
institutionalization of PMCs.  
The next chapter has the aim of setting the analysis’ results in a broader perspective by 
introducing them into the current NATO-debate. 
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4 Implications for NATO’s internal 
cohesion and solidarity 
This chapter builds on the results of the analysis from the preceding chapter, and has the 
purpose of answering the second research question: How can different approaches among 
NATO-members toward the use of PMCs affect NATO’s internal cohesion and solidarity?  
The analysis has shown that NATO-members have different approaches towards the use of 
PMCs. As has been argued, it is in essence a question of control over the system of a state’s 
civil-military relations. As already announced, this chapter will attempt to re-discuss parts of 
the internal NATO-debate, but now extending the parameters of the debate to also include the 
use of PMCs as an available option. The chapter will first present the diverging 
understandings regarding NATO’s role in international relations among NATO-members. 
Thereafter follows an assessment of how the results of the analysis match up with the 
diverging patterns within NATO. The effect on internal cohesion and solidarity will be 
evaluated on behalf of the pattern-matching in the subsequent section. The fourth section 
reviews the methodological delimitations which this thesis’ research design is subject to, and 
to what extent this may influence possible inferences. Finally, based on the discussion and 
methodological considerations, the fifth section will summarise the chapter and answer the 
second research question.    
4.1 Multi-tier alliance - diverging understandings  
When the existential threat from the Soviet Union disappeared, many scholars and observers 
of NATO predicted that the end of the alliance was inevitable. Nevertheless, through the 
development of new strategic concepts, incorporation of new members and a reorganisation 
of its military structure, the alliance proved its strongest critics wrong. To this regard, 
Hendrickson (2007) emphasises this particular point, arguing that the alliance has experienced 
many major disagreements, yet it has overcome them all by adapting and finding common 
ground.16 After the first decade of the new century, there appears however to again be a 
widening strategic rift among the allies. Different political standpoints in regard to 
Afghanistan, missile defence, the Georgian crisis of 2008, and enlargement exemplify the 
                                                 
16 Major crises have been the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956, French removal of NATO headquarters in 1966, and 
airstrikes against Libya in 1986, Ryan C. Hendrickson (2007). The Miscalculation of NATO's Death. 
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diverging interests among NATO-members. Consequently, a new debate on the future of the 
alliance has re-surfaced. The following discussion will understand the current NATO-debate 
in the light of the research from Noetzel and Schreer (2009a). Although their research 
visualises the NATO-debate in a parsimonious manner, their research is not an all-
encompassing description of NATO. 17 The following discussion must therefore be 
understood in the light of Noetzel and Schreer’s understanding of NATO.  
Noetzel and Schreer (2009a) argue that a process of disintegration within NATO has 
accelerated in recent years. The alliance has evolved from a two-tier into a multi-tier 
organisation. As a result of the increasing complexity of the tier-system, the alliance lacks a 
sufficient degree of coherence and is therefore limited and constrained when it comes to 
issues requiring the assertion of political will. The principal division in the multi-tier system 
concerns the role of military power in international relations and the role of military alliances. 
Collective defence and the principle of solidarity are no longer primary of many alliance-
members concerns. There no longer exists a solid consensus and cohesion within the alliance 
about the hierarchy of the roles the alliance is meant to perform. Instead, NATO is being 
transformed into a multilateral security forum where NATO-members increasingly find it 
hard to agree on and execute strategy.  
Multi-tier NATO is divided into three different tiers that are pulling the alliance in different 
directions. The first tier are the “reformers” who want NATO to take on a broader set of 
challenges that include the combating of weapons of mass destruction, providing energy 
security and the war against terror. In effect, the reformers want NATO to play a more 
prominent role in global security. The US is the core member of this tier. Other parties 
involved include the UK, the Netherlands, Canada and Denmark.  
The second tier is the “status-quo” group. Members of the status-quo tier are very sceptical 
about a globalised alliance. Instead they advocate for a more forceful articulation of what they 
perceive as European interests within the alliance. Their aim is partly to strengthen the 
                                                 
17 For more generic literature regarding the NATO debate see: ibid;  Paal S. Hilde and Helene F. Widerberg 
(2010). NATOs nye strategiske konsept og Norge;  Karl - Heinz Kamp (2010). NATO after Afghanistan. For 
literature concerning NATO and Afghanistan see: Renée De Nevers (2007). NATO's International Security Role 
in the Terrorist Era;  Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer (2009b). NATO's Vietnam? Afghanistan and the 
Future of the Atlantic Alliance.  For literature specifically concerning political consequences of enlargement see: 
Emanuel Adler (2008). The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practise, Self-restraint, and 
NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation.  For generic theoretical approaches towards NATO see: Alexandra 
Gheciu (2005). Security Institutions as Agents of Socialisation? NATO and the 'New Europe';  Frank 
Schimmelfennig (1998). NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation. 
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European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), secure continued American engagement in 
European security, and to avoid damaging their relationship towards other major powers such 
as Russia and China. Apart from France and Germany, NATO-members Spain, Italy and 
Belgium also belong to this tier.  
The third tier members are the “neo-traditionalists”, arguing for a reset of NATO strategic 
priorities, refocusing on defence against conventional threats. They call for an increase in 
troops for territorial defence rather than to strengthen NATO expeditionary capabilities. This 
tier is centred on the Central European NATO-members such as Poland, the Baltic States and 
the Czech Republic. Yet Nordic member Norway can also be said to belong to this group 
because of its converging interests with territorial defence due tensions with Russia about the 
Arctic (Noetzel & Schreer, 2009a:215-216; Noetzel & Schreer, 2009b:250).   
The starkest opposition is arguably between the reformist tier on the one side and the other 
two tiers on the other. Several studies have indicated that NATO will only remain relevant to 
the US if other members follow its reformist ambitions (Noetzel & Schreer, 2009a). Whereas 
the reformist group approaches a global role for NATO, the status-quo and the neo-
traditionalist group advocate a NATO closer to European interests. The status quo tier with 
France and Germany in the lead, are pushing for the development of the EU’s ESDP, whereas 
states like non EU-member Norway are more sceptical to a competing military cooperation 
within Europe. The difference among the latter two seems to be to what extent the EU 
becomes involved in European security policy. We can therefore visualise the three tiers on a 
global-regional dimension, where the reformers occupy the global end, and the status-quo and 
the neo-traditional tier the other end, although with diverging perceptions within the regional 
side. Comparing the global-regional dimension to the result from this thesis’ analysis, the 
global-regional dimension is interestingly paralleled by the results found in this thesis. The 
next section will elaborate this observation.  
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4.2 PMCs and the global-regional dimension 
The global-regional dimension is both paralleled in terms of the Huntington-Janowitz 
dimension, and to what extent NATO-members engage PMCs. The US and the UK both 
belong to the reformist tier, are close to the Huntington understanding compared to the other 
two cases under study, and the most actively employers of PMCs. Contrary, Germany and 
Norway, represented by the status-quo and the neo-traditional tier respectively, are compared 
to the US and the UK closer to the Janowitzian understanding, and the most restrictive users 
of PMCs.  
Moreover, in order to reconnect with the theoretical concept of this thesis, it can be argued 
that the competing nature of the contrasting theories also matches the tiers’ alignment on the 
global-regional dimension. From a theoretical perspective, Burk (2002) argues that 
Huntington and Janowitz arrive at different conclusions because each theory is based on a 
different understanding of democracy.18 Huntington departs from a liberal democratic 
understanding whereas Janowitz builds on a civic-republican understanding. Liberal 
democratic theory argues that the first priority of the state is to protect its citizens and their 
rights and liberties. Civic republican democratic theory on the other hand distinguishes itself 
from liberal theory by promoting active participation of citizens in the sphere of public life as 
the highest virtue. Citizenship is based on the participation in the rule and defence of the 
republic. The central problem in this model from the state’s view is how to preserve and 
combine the citizens’ rights and enthusiasm to participation with a willingness to serve as 
soldiers and protect the republic from defeat in war. Huntington is thus primarily concerned 
with protecting democratic values, whereas Janowitz worries about the sustaining of 
democratic values. In order to protect democratic values, in line with a liberal understanding, 
the military needs to be subordinate to the civilian power, but it is not necessarily required to 
act according to democratic values. Contrary, to sustain democratic values, the military must 
embody and identify substantively with the society it defends. (Burk, 2002:10-12).  
Applying the insight from Burk to the paralleling dimensions, it is captivating that the global-
regional debate also reflects the underlying logic from the theoretical concept. The reformist 
tier for instance, is primarily promoting that NATO should be an enforcer of democratic 
norms and values in the context of an international liberal democratic order. NATO 
                                                 
18 For more civil-military relations literature concerning Huntington and Janowitz see footnote  4, p. 11 and  
footnote 5, p.12.  
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enlargement and power projection is by the reformers viewed as a tool to broaden NATO’s 
influence, also beyond European territory, even if it includes incorporation of militarily weak 
and politically unstable states (Noetzel & Schreer, 2009a:215-217). This clearly reflects a 
situation closer to the liberal democratic understanding, which is the basis for Huntington, 
where the concern of protecting democratic values is primary. In contrast, the tiers at the 
regional end are more concerned with integrating NATO to European security issues, and are 
also very aware of others perception of NATO’s role. This arguably reflects a concern of 
sustaining democratic values, leaning towards a civic-republican understanding, which is the 
fundament for Janowitz.  
The aim here is not to explain the reasons for the diverging positions within NATO. Rather, 
the point of the argument is to indicate that the different approaches towards the 
institutionalisation of PMCs may also reflect deeper differences among NATO-members 
when it comes to understanding democracy and the role of the alliance. This is a purely 
theoretical argument which is not tested on data by this study, yet it is thought-provoking that 
both the results of this study and the underlying competing nature of the theoretical concept 
match the contemporary pattern of the multi-tier system within NATO.  
Continuing with the resemblance between the global-regional and Huntington-Janowitz 
dimension, to what extent does the paralleling of these dimensions further reinforce or 
weaken the already present diverging forces within NATO, consequently affecting both 
internal cohesion and solidarity? NATO cohesion is here understood as to what extent may 
the use of PMCs further increase or decrease the entrenchment of the different tiers within the 
alliance, whereas NATO solidarity is here understood as a measurement of NATO-member’s 
willingness to act in support of other allies. The causal relationship between the two is 
assumingly running from cohesion towards solidarity, meaning that solidarity is likely to be 
reduced if cohesion among members is diverging. Reduced solidarity is in turn again assumed 
to influence cohesion negatively in the sense that if an ally feels a lack of support in times of 
need, his sense of cohesion towards other will arguably be reduced.  
I will in the proceeding continue with the simplified depict of NATO’s multi-tier system by 
simple referring to it as the global-regional dimension. The fulcrum of the discussion will 
therefore be centred on the contrasting American, in particular the US, and the non-reformist 
European perceptions on NATO’s role as a military power in international relations.  
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4.3 PMCs, internal cohesion, and solidarity 
Starting with political cohesion and assuming that governments must play two-level games in 
international negotiations, that is to simultaneously monitor and reconcile international and 
national politics (Putnam, 1988:434),19 the use of a PMC instead of national military assets 
may arguably both relieve and increase internal friction. The use of PMCs may be a relief in 
sense that NATO-members belonging to the reformist tier, in particular the US, can contract a 
PMC for the provision of required assets that it needs in order to fulfil operational 
requirements for an assumed controversial perceived mission, rather than having a European 
non-reformist providing the same military function. By doing so, the US evades debates 
concerning which other ally’s responsibility it is to provide the required military function.  
Evidence indicating US’ potential inclination to hire PMCs over European allies is already 
documented. For instance, during the initial intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, the US 
rejected many European offers of troop contributions due to differences in levels of 
technological sophistication. The Bush Administration also wanted to avoid having allies 
dictate how the war should be fought, as well as difficulties to gain allied consensus on 
strategy similar to those that had developed during NATO’s bombing of Serbia in 1999 (De 
Nevers, 2007:43; 49). Moreover, especially between the US and other allies there is a huge 
capabilities gap, and lack of interoperability due different technological standards. The 
alliance is further notoriously short on crucial military functions such as tactical airlift, 
specialised infantry, and military assistance units that would be vital for an operation such as 
Afghanistan. There is also a lack of flexible and mobile combat reserves, and personnel for 
military and police training. The reason behind this situation is foremost a matter of 
differences in defence-spending among NATO members (Noetzel & Schreer, 2009b:534). 
Acknowledging these empirical insights, the use of PMCs may be an option in order to by-
pass some of the resource constrains attached to especially European allies.  
Hiring a military function which otherwise would have, or must have been provided by 
European allies, also relives the latter’s government from domestic opposition if the US’ 
actions are not perceived as justified by the European public. For instance, only six NATO-
members operate without political restrictions in Afghanistan (De Nevers, 2007:51), and four 
                                                 
19 For more theoretical background to this argument and its application to the specific case of Europe, see: Janne 
Haaland Matlary (2009). European Union Security Dynamics: In the New National Interest. 
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of them are aligned with the US in the reformist tier20 (Noetzel & Schreer, 2009b:540). For 
the particular case of Afghanistan, NATO is politically divided on the issue of whether the 
core of the operation is counter-insurgency or stability and reconstruction. This divergence 
has lead to different regional responsibilities with the result of different operational realities 
and sharing of risk and burden. Especially NATO-members who operate in the south of 
Afghanistan where the insurgency has proved to be the most resistant, have experienced over-
proportional losses compared to allies who operate in the far safer north. For NATO-members 
in the south of Afghanistan, the ISAF operation over all demonstrates that not all allies are 
willing to and prepared to share equal risk (Noetzel & Schreer, 2009b:532).  
In order to relieve the strain on NATO-members, the increased use of PMCs could act as a 
burden-sharing valve. For instance, realities regarding NATO’s training mission in Iraq in 
2004 reflect the potential of this argument. The training mission was assigned to educate Iraqi 
officers in military skill and tactics. NATO-members contributed with staff personnel and 
instructors, yet not soldiers to guard their facilities in Iraq. Instead, the task was contracted to 
a PMC because no NATO-member was willing to accept the risk attached to guarding the 
camp (CRS Report for Congress, 2007:3). Some NATO-officers assigned to the mission were 
even unaware until their arrival in Iraq that a PMC was guarding the camp (Svendsen, 2009).  
Although there was consensus to hire the PMC for guarding the facilities in Iraq (CRS Report 
for Congress, 2007:3), substituting national contributions with PMCs is however a dangerous 
path for NATO to endure, because it does not solve the underlying problems of the alliance. 
Different perceptions and understandings of NATO’s role will not change simply by venting 
out some of the frustration with the use of PMCs. Although the use of PMCs in the short term 
may be perceived as a relief, it will arguably in the long term become a liability rather than an 
asset, and hence result in an increase of friction among NATO-members. Two developments 
are critical in this regard.  
First, in order to achieve cohesion, NATO must be consistent with its own principles. A 
fragmented approach towards the use of PMCs may severely hurt the legitimacy of the 
alliance. NATO is not only a military alliance but to a very large extent also a political 
alliance. Its political dimension is reflected in the sense that the alliance promotes democratic 
values and encourages consultation and cooperation on defence and security issues to build 
                                                 
20 These are in addition to the US; the UK, Canada, Denmark and the Netherlands. 
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trust, and in the long run prevent conflict (NATO, 2011). The requirement for unanimous 
voting in the North Atlantic Council21, ensures every member’s sovereignty and the 
representation of NATO towards the outside as a unified actor. In order to successfully 
present itself as such, the alliance must be consistent and a unified democratic institution 
where democratic consistency is represented through all levels of decision-making, starting 
with the electorate of member-states.  
Hence, at any one time, NATO’s polices and institutions are constrained by beliefs about their 
legitimacy and accountability22. Yet, beliefs about NATO’s legitimacy are in turn influenced 
by how NATO approaches the outside world. NATO’s external polices impact on outsider’s 
considerations and perceptions of NATO performance, identity and accountability. The 
success of developing as a legitimate international actor will depend on how NATO manages 
this feedback loop in order to maintain consistency with alliance values. However, the 
introduction of PMC has in many cases severely challenged democratic principles, and 
therefore potentially threatened NATO legitimacy. NATO-members more concerned with 
sustaining democratic values will probably therefore feel even more dispatched from the 
reformist tier, if the behaviour of the latter through the use of PMCs is severely damaging the 
legitimacy of the alliance in its pursuit of protecting democratic values.  
Second, an increased reliance on PMCs may lead to a perception of being a “second best 
choice” among European allies who lag behind with military modernisation and 
interoperability. It will be fatal to NATO if such a thought would become embedded among 
European members, because it would arguably promote the further evolution of an 
independent European security policy in terms of the ESDP. Especially members of the 
status-quo tier would advocate an EU-alternative. On the other hand, the status-quo tier 
members are also very concerned that the US will uproot its embedment with European 
security. The ESDP will therefore not substitute NATO in the near future, yet the perception 
of “being second best” may however lead to a stronger self-perception and articulation of 
European interests, thereby reducing cohesion across the global-regional dimension.  
                                                 
21 NATO’s principal political decision-making body. 
22 Accountability implies that some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, judge whether 
they have fulfilled their responsibilities in accordance with those standards, and impose sanctions if these 
responsibilities are not met ( Ruth W. Grant and Robert O.  Keohane (2005). Accountability and Abuses of 
Power in World Politics.:29.) 
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In sum, the use of PMC within a NATO context, is arguably affecting internal cohesion and 
solidarity more negatively than positively. Before final inferences to this argument are drawn, 
we must review to what degree the thesis research design has influenced the results of the 
analysis and the subsequent discussion of the results. The next section therefore provides an 
assessment of the study’s overall research design. 
4.4 Theoretical and methodological considerations 
Inferences are always subject to a degree of uncertainty. To conclude with inferences based 
on uncertain data leads by its own logic to an awareness of not being able to precisely 
determine any given inference. A description of diversity or causality is thus not complete 
without an assessment of estimated uncertainness (King; Keohane & Verba, 1994:31-32). 
This section will comment theoretical and methodological issues which need to be considered 
respectively in order to arrive at valid inferences.23  
Because the theoretical background relies on two conflicting understandings of democracy, 
the analysis and discussion will to some extent be pre-determined by the theoretical design if 
both theoretical understandings are represented by the data. For example, just like many 
studies of the EU which are based on a realist approach must necessarily conclude that the EU 
is a weak actor in international relations because realism presumes a unified rational state - 
something which the EU is not, this study’s contrasting results are inherently antagonist 
because we assume so in the theoretical concept. The results of the analysis and discussion 
must therefore be seen in light of the theoretical background.  
The discussion did not pay attention to changing political trends within NATO. The multi-tier 
system may change if the current political leadership is replaced through elections, or if 
perceptions among one of the tiers changes due other circumstances. In fact, Hilde and 
Widerberg have reviewed the outcome of the last NATO-summit in Lisbon in 2010, and 
indicate that non-reformist perceptions about NATOs role are gaining ground (Hilde & 
Widerberg, 2010). If so, many of the discussed concerns would arguably decrease, or even 
erode, because the use of PMCs in such a case will be proportional less relevant. PMCs will 
arguably still be relevant for the training of military forces, yet a reduction in global ambitions 
will arguably decrease the need for PMCs to perform military functions abroad. The harshest 
                                                 
23 Please recall that specific methodological and theoretical delimitations to solving the first research question 
are commented in connection with the analysis in chapter 3. 
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stalemate is arguably along the global-regional dimension. I the whole of NATO would re-
focus on regional matters, many of the disagreements would lose their significance because 
the simply become irrelevant.  
The limited number of cases selected for this study affects the possibility for broad 
generalisations among NATO-members. The research population for this study are four 
NATO member-states. Given the historic legacy, one can argue that the rationale for being a 
member differs especially between traditional Western European NATO-states and, on the 
other hand former Warsaw-Pact members and Soviet Republics. This argument is rooted in 
the observation that the latter seek to the alliance, and specifically the U.S, for the protection 
against Russia, whereas the original west-European states rather have a European focus with a 
different perception of Russia. This has resulted in different policy approaches towards the 
alliance and its different members. For instance, it is assumed that many of the former 
Warsaw Pact members and Soviet Republics have willingly supported US initiatives in 
Afghanistan and Iraq in order to increase their political credit with Washington as a hedge 
against Moscow (Fawn, 2006; Kamp, 2010). Western European states have on the contrary 
been very sceptical to using NATO as a global instrument for achieving security objectives. A 
selection of cases (i.e. NATO-member states) that resembles both historic legacies would 
therefore ensure a better representation of the different perceptions concerning the alliance 
purpose.    
Moreover, as has been documented in this thesis analysis, different states have different 
approaches to the question of privatising security. Given the long traditions of market 
liberalization in the US and UK, one can argue that the US and UK are more prone to private 
solutions than NATO-members with a stronger socialist legacy. On the basis of these 
ideological differences across Europe, one can identify an assumed continuum of several 
types of democracies and their relationship towards private solutions, each NATO-member 
representing a different position on the continuum. At the one end we find the US and UK. 
The opposite end is occupied by former Soviet and Warsaw pact members. The middle 
consists of the Scandinavian model and the Continental model, characterized by their mixed 
economies. The selection of NATO-members such as Poland (former Warsaw Pact), and 
Latvia (former Soviet Republic), in addition to the four cases selected, would have ensured a 
better representation of NATO today.  
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Nevertheless, the exclusion of East European members is justified by the following three 
reasons. First, as already mentioned, the cases selected are chosen because these particular 
NATO-members also represent rival opinions within the current NATO-debate. This was one 
of the prime criteria for case selection in order to be able to add the findings of this study to 
the contemporary NATO-debate in terms of what is referred to as the global-regional 
dimension. East European members do necessarily represent any directly opposing opinions 
in regard to this debate. They are also indirectly represented through the case of Norway.  
Second, although the assumed most socialist economies are not represented when viewed in a 
historical perspective, the case sample selected here still represents diverging approaches 
when it comes to marked liberalisation. The Continental and Scandinavian model, which in 
this study is represented by Germany and Norway respectively, does to a fair degree also 
represent similar NATO-members given the relative homogeneous economic model across 
Europe due to the regime of the EU, and the many social-democratic and socialist trends that 
one finds within Western Europe.  
Third, finding English written sources for the East European cases also proved to be very 
difficult. In order to stay within the resource limits of this Thesis, East European members 
were also partly dismissed because of this reason.   
Even though it is important to highlight that these limitations do exist, and to assess their 
potential implications for drawing valid inferences, it is equally important to strive to 
overcome them. For instance, as Lijphart (1975:172) in his article about strategy in 
comparative studies emphasises; “one may partially and carefully generalize to similar cases 
that share the same characteristics as the ones under study”. Therefore, we may still draw 
inferences as long as the theoretical and methodological delimitations are assessed and 
accounted for. With these comments in place, the next sections summarises the discussion and 
draws inferences in regard to the thesis’ second research question.  
4.5 Summary; answering research question 2 
The second research question asked: how can different policy standards towards the use of 
PMCs may affect internal cohesion and solidarity? The preceding discussion has revealed a 
captivating pattern. There is arguably a resemblance between the Huntington-Janowitz 
dimension, reflecting different approaches towards the institutionalisation of PMCs, and the 
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global-regional dimension which is reflecting NATO-members perceptions of the alliance 
role in international relations. Moreover, the discussion also found indications, based on 
theoretical reasoning, that the different institutionalisations of PMCs also may reflect a deeper 
divergence among NATO-members regarding their understanding of democracy and the role 
of NATO.  
To what extent does the alignment of the Huntington-Janowitz dimension with the global-
regional dimension further enhance or reduce the stalemate between the different tiers?  The 
use of PMCs as a substitute for national contributions was argued to potentially provide relief 
to further internal disagreement and negative domestic perceptions. Yet, it is more likely that 
the Huntington-Janowitz dimension will increase the already present friction among the tiers 
on the global-regional dimension because temporary reliance on PMCs only postpones 
unresolved disagreements. The strongest support to this claim is that different approaches 
towards the use of PMCs, and the consequences thereof, undermine NATO’s legitimacy as a 
unified actor in international relations. As was made clear during the development of the 
indicator for social control, states are obligated to prevent, legislate, investigate, prosecute and 
punish abuses of force by PMCs that are acting on their behalf.24 This point illustrates that 
controversial action undertaken by one or several members may potentially hurt the integrity 
of others because of their mutual connection through the alliance. Thus, if others cannot 
identify with particular members of the alliance due for example violations of human rights 
by the latter, cohesion will be significantly reduced. If cohesion starts to erode, solidarity will 
be affected too, because an ally’s willingness to contribute to the alliance is arguably reduced 
if a common ground cannot be found.  
In order to answer the second research question, the discussion analysis’ results leads towards 
the inference that internal cohesion and solidarity will be negatively affected in the long run if 
they remain unattended.  
 
                                                 
24 See page 24 for a review. 
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5 Conclusion  
This thesis was motivated by the purpose of interpreting and understanding different 
approaches towards the use of PMCs among NATO-members in the light of the civil-military 
relations literature. The aim was not to test the theories of either Huntington or Janowitz. 
Rather, their purpose was to provide a theoretical framework from which theoretical 
embedded understandings towards institutionalisation of PMCs could be drawn.  
The analysis of the first research question confirmed that the different NATO-members under 
study, the US, the UK and Germany and Norway, represent diverging approaches towards the 
institutionalisation of PMCs. The second research question thereafter assessed the analysis’ 
findings, and concluded that diverging privatisation patterns affect internal cohesion and 
solidarity negatively. How does this affect the broader perspective?  Will NATO again be 
able to overcome internal disagreements? What can eventually be done? Answering these 
questions fully and throughout is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is arguably 
possible to indicate areas of improvement.  
Returning to the fundamental stalemate within NATO, it is in principle a debate about the role 
of military power in international relations and military alliances. The findings of this study 
indicate that NATO-members arguably diverge in the deepest sense when it comes to their 
understanding of how democracy should be fostered. A debate specifically targeting the 
balance between protecting and sustaining democratic values has the potential of providing 
more nuances to the different perceptions within the multi-tier system.  
In order to defuse the Huntington-Janowitz dimension, NATO-members should first strive to 
solve whether PMCs can be a part of the greater military role NATO wants to be in 
international relations. It is unlikely that the PMI will dissolve in the near future. A shared 
standard towards the institutionalisation of PMCs must therefore be introduced in order to 
create consistency among NATO-members. This will not be easy, but unresolved differences 
on how to approach the institutionalisation and use of PMCs will otherwise continue to cause 
controversies.  
Further avenues for proceeding research could be to expand the present study to include a 
broader sample of NATO-members. Especially East European NATO-members are 
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underrepresented, thus having a high potential for improving the external validity of the 
results.  
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List of Abbreviations 
ACHR American Convention on Human Rights 
CRS Congressional Research Service (US) 
BWB Bundesamt für Wehrtechnik und Beschaffung (GER) 
DoD Department of Defence (US) 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy 
EU European Union 
FMoD Federal Ministry of Defence (GER) 
GAO Governmental Accountability Office (US) 
GCs Geneva Conventions 
GEBB Gesellschaft für Entwicklung, Beschaffung und Betrieb (GER) 
GER Germany 
HRL Human Rights Law 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
IACtHR Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
IHL International Humanitarian Law 
ILC International Law Commission 
ISAF International Security Assistance Force 
MoD Ministry of Defence (UK) 
NAR North-Atlantic Region 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NGO Non-governmental organisation 
NMoD Norwegian Ministry of Defence  
NOR Norway 
OPP Public Private Partnership (NOR) 
OPS Public Private Cooperation (NOR) 
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PMC Private Military Contractor 
PMI Private Military Industry 
PPI Private Finance Initiative 
PPP Public Private Partnerships 
PRIV-WAR EU research project on PMI and international humanitarian law 
UN United Nations 
US/USA United States/ of America 
QCA Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
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